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In this thesis we have realized a research aimed at understanding whether there was any 
association between the introduction of the IFRS 10, in place of the IAS 27, and the investment 
decisions of Italian groups. If this hypothesis was verified, in fact, we might have understood 
whether parent companies had been applying properly the consolidation rules or if they had 
been manipulating them, eventually trying to hide some subsidiaries. 
Developing an analysis of this kind is interesting because it allows to understand the way in 
which companies apply the accounting principles. These rules, in fact, are at the basis of the 
preparation of the financial statements which are the main instrument that people interacting 
with economic entities have to know them and, consequently, affect the functioning of the 
economic environment. 
The first economic principle dealing with the regulation of the consolidated financial statement 
was the IAS 27, which was later accompanied by the SIC 12. Despite the good intentions of 
regulators, it seemed that this accounting principle was not providing a proper discipline. The 
literature, in fact, suggested that parents wondering to lie about the entities controlled, had the 
possibility to do that. The Great Recession somehow confirmed these clues, in fact it took to 
the failure of entities that were apparently going well. 
After this, the IASB has decided to reshape the consolidation rules, in order to not leave any 
room for manipulations. The result of this work has been the publication of the IFRS 10. 
The scope of the analysis presented in this thesis, is that of understanding whether companies 
have somehow reacted to the new consolidation principles, and whether this one had been 
unmasking any liar. In particular, if companies had really been lying and if the new standard 
had left any space for loopholes, we might have expected a modification of parents’ investment 
behavior. 
The biggest problem with this analysis has regarded the fact that it was very hard finding a 
variable that, eventually, would have appropriately shown the change in the investment choices 
realized. Because of that, in order to not leave anything untested, we have verified six 
hypotheses, with six relative models. In particular, we have tried to understand whether the 
relative equity investments, the total linkages connecting the companies being part of the group 
and the absolute and relative indirect linkages, were negatively associated with the introduction 
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of the IFRS 10. Then we have verified whether the absolute and relative direct linkages were 
positively connected with the issuance of the new consolidation rules.  
The practical realization of the analysis has started with the collection of the data referring to 
the balance sheets of thirty-six groups listed in the STAR segment of Borsa Italiana, from 2010 
to 2016. The equations have been shaped in such a way that it was possible to control for all 
the possible factors that might have affected our dependent variables, considering the parent 
and the group. In this way, in fact, it would have been possible to take into account the drivers 
of the choices of the parent and the characteristics of the tools at its disposal (its subsidiaries). 
After having deepened the analyses considering the whole sample first, and then separately big 
and small groups, we have been able to get answers for our questions. 
In particular, it has not been possible to find any association between the introduction of the 
new consolidation rules and the relative equity investments, the total control and the absolute 
direct control. Differently, it has been possible to accept the other hypotheses, and to observe a 
negative association with the absolute and relative indirect control and a positive association 
with the relative direct control. 
Staying at these results, it seems that, after the introduction of the IFRS 10, parents had not 
addressed less resources to the equity investments, in fact nor their relative amount, nor the 
total control had decreased; but eventually they had changed the way in which they were 
investing. The negative association with the indirect control suggests that maybe they had 
started to divest some indirect participations, leaving more space to the direct ones. 
Naturally, these conclusions may be biased by many limits, regarding the sample, or the model, 
but surely may be considered as a clue for further researches, aimed at understanding how 
companies deal with economic principles and how those should be structured to represent the 
reality in the most trustworthy way. 
The thesis is organized in three chapters. The first chapter explains the relevance of the annual 
reports, with a precise focus on the consolidated ones. Then it presents the rules provided by 
the IAS 27 and the IFRS 10, explaining the differences and the similarities. Finally, it reports 
some analyses that have tried to define the reaction of groups to the newest rules. It follows the 
second chapter, with the explanation of the way in which the model has been built. Then it 
concludes with the third chapter that describes the variables and presents the results, 
highlighting their eventual causes and limits. 
Chapter One 
 




FROM IAS 27 TO IFRS 10 WITH THE AIM TO IMPROVE THE 
CONSOLIDATION PRINCIPLE 
 
1.1 The truth as a tool for the proper functioning of the economy 
Balance sheets are the instruments that companies use to communicate what they are to the 
stakeholders that interact with them through financings, investments, sales, purchases and 
transactions of any kind. The preparation of these documents must be done following specific 
rules, that generate a language that allows to represent similar situations in the same way, letting 
users understand what is going on, without being obstructed by the specific codification. 
The aim of these rules, the economic principles, is that of portraying the economic condition of 
the company in a way that is as much adherent as possible to the reality, to give to the ones 
interacting with the business the possibility to have a realistic idea of what is going on, in order 
to take proper decisions. It is only knowing the truth, in fact, that those stakeholders will be 
able to understand the actual risk that they are facing, and to be prepared to deal with whatever 
may come. 
The fact is that such propensity to the total truthfulness may be a problem for companies trying 
to hide what is really happening to show an image of what they are that is more convenient for 
the achievement of their objectives. As an example, it is possible to consider a business trying 
to obtain a financing from an investor, but not fulfilling all the requisites that would allow the 
closing of the deal. In this case, there might be an incentive to hide the truth, manipulating the 
rules, in order to be compliant with what the counterpart requires and to obtain the money. 
Thus companies may be encouraged to reinterpret the regulation, finding loopholes that make 
them apparently compliant with the standards, while actually hiding the truth. 
It is obvious that no one would like or would expect a behavior like this, the objective and the 
purpose is that of building the economy with as many (real) information as possible, in order to 
evaluate properly the businesses, to build solid transactions and to take adequate risks. It is only 
in an environment like this that it is possible to find a correct functioning of the economy. 
Whenever the truth is hidden, the economy staggers up to a breaking point, as it has happened 
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Meanwhile it is not either possible to imagine that all companies try to find ways to misrepresent 
their conditions. Those liars are out there and it is not possible to not think of them when trying 
to improve the functioning of the economy, but there are also honest companies that allow good 
and correctly evaluated transactions. 
The natural consequence of these attempts to adopt loopholes is the need to find the “black 
sheep” and to understand where and which standards fail, in order to improve and eventually 
fix them (thus leaving no spaces for eventual misinterpretations), to have as many “white sheep” 
as possible. 
 
 1.2 Not just standing alone entities: groups and their regulation 
Companies do not just work as standing alone entities, in fact they may also choose to acquire 
portions of equity of other businesses, with the aim of enlarging their activity. The result of 
these transactions is the formation of groups, in which each entity is legally autonomous, but 
economically dependent on the others and subject to a unitary management (Campobasso, 
2015). 
Considering this particular connection, since 1977, regulators have been asking to the parent 
companies of these groups to prepare the consolidated financial statement, which displays the 
activity carried by the entities that compose the group looking at them as a whole, and not as 
separated businesses. 
In this way, the results of the actions undertaken as an organization are adequately 
counterbalanced by the activities owned by the group, and do not just affect the financial 
statement of the investor, without proper compensation. 
Naturally, the necessity of having reliable information, and thus to provide specific regulation, 
stands also when talking about the economic activity carried by groups. But, in this case, there 
is an additional problem, in fact regulators also need to create principles that allow to properly 
identify the investees being controlled by the parent, in order to obtain a realistic identification 
of the consolidation area. 
Thus, when dealing with these particular realities, it is possible to have manipulations of the 
principles relative to the economic conditions of the entity but also that of those ruling the 
delimitation of the consolidation perimeter. 
As a consequence, when trying to improve the regulation of these aggregations of businesses, 
the first step to take in order to identify those unproductive black sheep is that of defining, in 
the best possible way, the consolidation area. 
Chapter One 
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 1.2.1 Defining the consolidation area: difficulties and attempts  
The realization of the consolidated financial statement is extremely significant because of the 
higher relevance of the values here disclosed, the higher timeliness and the smaller possibility 
of earnings management1 that allow a better predictive capacity of the future outcomes. The 
simple financial statement of the holding, in fact, would only provide information about the 
returns of the investments, made without showing the respective counterpart. 
Giving a proper definition of the consolidation perimeter is of huge relevance, it is in fact from 
this concept that comes the financial statement of the group, which represents those different 
businesses as if they were a unique entity and consequently provides an appropriate disclosure. 
If even one of those investees, being actually controlled, would not fall within the boards, the 
operations, the transactions and the results of the group would be misrepresented. Such distorted 
disclosure would take to inappropriate decisions and evaluations from subjects that interact with 
the group, such as financiers, investors and analysts, with consequences for the whole economy. 
An improvement in the identification of the consolidation area may be particularly evident 
looking at bigger groups, since that those might have been hiding more subsidiaries (Hsu, 
Pourjalali, 2015). 
Summing up, wrong information about the actual composition, and thus about the actual size 
of the group, does not allow to evaluate it correctly. 
Differently from what it may appear, delimiting the boards of a group of entities is not that easy, 
because of the natural mismatch between the concept of group, and its accounting definition. 
No matter the principle considered, the economic concept of group does not necessarily fit with 
the consolidation area, that is the reason why some companies being actually controlled by the 
parent are not consolidated. It may happen, in fact, that the company is able to exercise its 
control over an entity, not through the owning of its shares, but through the specific relation 
that connects the two of them (this is what may happen with the suppliers). Those businesses, 
even falling out of the consolidation area, are still able to influence the performance of the group 
(Meyssonnier, Pourtier, 2013). 
                                                          
1 If an entity is not consolidated, the parent can put in place transactions that allow to transfer 
amounts out of the group, shaping the results as it prefers. But once that this entity is 
consolidated, and because of the elimination of the intragroup transactions, no operation would 
still allow to move out of the group those amounts. 
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Considered this, the objective can be nothing but that of reducing this discrepancy, in order to 
have annual reports that represent in the best possible way which are the subsidiaries of the 
holding.  
 
 1.3 Ruling the preparation of the balance sheet: economic principles 
With the globalization, it has been possible to observe the formation of more and more groups, 
which has brought the need to compare their performances on a universal level. In order to do 
this, it was necessary to level out the economic principles to which making reference when 
writing the annual report. Such harmonization has allowed to have transparent, interpretable 
and comparable annual reports (Iannucci, 2018). 
On an international level, the most common economic principles are the International 
Accounting Standards (IAS) and the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). The 
IAS, released since 1973 by the International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) have 
been the first attempt to standardize the economic principles internationally. Then, from 2001, 
when the IASC was renamed as International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), it started 
the release of the IFRS, that have revised or replaced some of the IAS. Thus, nowadays IAS 
and IFRS coexist. 
Over than one hundred and twenty countries from all over the world ask their companies to 
comply with the IAS/IFRS, mainly for the writing of the annual reports of the listed companies, 
in order to allow a fair comparison with the financial statements of companies from other 
countries.  
A great exception is represented by America which mainly adopts the Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles (GAAP), even if since 2002 the Financial Accounting Standard Board2 
(FASB) and the IASB have been cooperating for a convergence of these two sets of principles. 
The European Union (EU) has been applying the IFRS since 2002, with the Regulation (CE) n. 
1606/2002 which imposes the adoption of these principles to companies whose stocks are 
traded on public markets (art. 4) for the businesses starting from January 1st, 2005. The 
regulation also allows the adoption of these economic principles to companies that decide to 
apply them, after their own valuations (art. 5). 
 
                                                          
2 The FASB is the board that issues the GAAP. 
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Before than being applied, IAS/IFRS economic principles are analyzed by a technical 
committee, the European Financial Reporting Advisory Group (EFRAG), and a political one, 
the Accounting Regulatory Committee (ACR). Finally, to be homologated, they need to be 
approved by the Standards Advice Review Group (SARG). 
The first economic principle dealing with the provisions for the preparation of the financial 
statement of groups and with the definition of the concept of control was the IAS 3, released on 
June 1976 and entered into force in 1977. 
While the first EU provision dealing with group reporting was the directive n. 83/349/CEE. 
In 1989, the IAS 3 was replaced by IAS 27 which was modified in 1994, 1998, 2003, and finally 
in 2008 (Deloitte, 2011). 
On May 2011, it was issued the IFRS 10 which has replaced the IAS 27 and has been effective 
for businesses starting from January 1st, 2013 (Galberti, 2012). 
 
 1.4 International Accounting Standard (IAS) 273 
The International Accounting Standard 27 must be applied by the parent company when 
preparing the consolidated annual report of the group, thus referring to it-self and all of its 
subsidiaries. In fact, the standard defines the consolidated financial statement as “the annual 
report of a group presented as if it was the annual report of a unique economic entity”. 
This economic principle may be applied also by companies that choose to or that must (because 
of a national provision) prepare the separated annual report4 when accounting for their shares 




                                                          
3 The instructions provided in this paragraph refer to the version of the IAS 27 issued on January 
10th, 2008, the latest adopted by the European Union through the Regulation (CE) N. 494/2009.  
4 The separate annual report is that prepared by an investor that has significant influence on an 
investee or that has joint control over it. Differently, the consolidated annual report is the one 
prepared by the holding when referring to a group, considered as a unique economic entity. 
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None of the entities controlled by the parent company can be excluded from the consolidation 
area, no matter the type of entity that it is (investment entities of any kind), how far its activity 
is from the one exercised by the holding and if there are eventual impediments that do not give 
the investee the possibility to transfer capitals to the parent5. 
As highlighted in the previous paragraph, this economic principle has undergone several 
modifications mainly aimed at reducing the possibilities of finding loopholes to avoid the 
consolidation of the subsidiaries. Among the others, it has been possible to observe the 
elimination of the provisions regarding the exemption for temporary control6, potential voting 
rights and the adoption of different economic principles among subsidiaries. 
 
 1.4.1 Presentation of the consolidated annual report 
The standard requires that all parent companies must prepare the consolidated annual report, 
but some exceptions are provided. 
Specifically, an entity is exempted from preparing the consolidated financial statement if and 
only if: 
1. It is it-self wholly, or partially, controlled by another entity and the shareholders, 
included the ones not having voting rights, have been informed and agree with the 
choice of not presenting the consolidated annual report; 
2. Its debt or equity securities are not listed on a public market; 
3. The controlling entity has not deposited, nor is about to deposit, its annual report to any 
entity with the aim of issuing any category of financial securities on a public market; 
4. The controlling, or any other intermediate controlling entity prepares a consolidated 
balance sheet publicly available and compliant with the IFRS. 
                                                          
5 Despite such provision, many parent companies have continued to exclude from the 
consolidation area some of their subsidiaries, referring to the economic and financial relevance 
required by the frameworks of the IASB for the preparation of the annual report. 
6 In the previous versions of the standard, it was provided an exemption from consolidation for 
investees that were only acquired for temporary control, if there were proofs that those would 
have been written off within twelve months and that the parent was looking for an acquirer.  
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If, in these cases, the company chooses to not present the consolidated annual report, but to 
prepare the separate one, it is required to provide additional information. In fact, the entity must 
specify that it has chosen to opt for the exemption from the consolidation, that the one that it is 
presenting is a separate annual report and all the information that regard it as a society. Then, it 
will have to issue a list of all the shares owned, of any kind, and any specification about such 
holdings and the relative entities. Finally, it must be specified the criterion chosen to account 
these shareholdings. 
 
1.4.2 Control: concept, valuation and loss 
The consolidated annual report must refer to the entities that the parent company controls. 
It is presumed that there is control whenever the holding company owns, directly, or indirectly, 
more than half of the voting rights, unless it can be clearly proved that there is no control. In 
these cases, the holding is required to provide supplementary information to explain which are 
the reasons why its holdings do not allow to have control over the investee. 
There is control also if the holding owns less than, or the half, of the voting rights and it has: 
1. The control of more than the half of the voting rights because of contractual 
arrangements with other investors; 
2. The power to determine the managerial and financial policies because of a statute or a 
deal; 
3. The power to appoint or disappoint the majority of the members of the board of 
directors, or its equivalent, and the control of the entity is owned by that board; 
4. The power to exercise the majority of the voting rights during meeting of the board of 
directors, or its equivalent, and that board has the power over the entity. 
When evaluating the existence of the control, it is also necessary to take into account the 
potential voting rights. Those are securities of any kind that, if exercised or converted, would 




 ~ 18 ~      
 
Such rights must be taken into account only if are currently exercisable7. When making such 
assessments, the entity will evaluate all the facts and circumstances affecting the exercisability, 
but not the intentions or the financial ability of the investor.  
The holding loses control when it loses the power to influence the financial and managerial 
policies of the investee in order to obtain the benefits coming from its activities.  
Such loss may be due to a change of the relative or absolute share, to a single or to multiple 
deals, or to events which fall outside the intervention of the parent, such as the subjection to a 
governmental authority. 
 
 1.4.3 Consolidation procedures 
When preparing the consolidated annual report, the parent company aggregates, voice by voice, 
its and its investees’ balance sheets, that will refer to the same closing date and will follow the 
same economic principles8. 
This must be done since the very first moment in which the parent obtains the control. 
Then, for the consolidated accounts to present information as if they were referring to one 
unique economic entity, it is required the application of the acquisition method. It implies, 
among the others, the elimination of the intra group transactions and the proportional attribution 
of any profit, and of all the other components of the income statement, to the investors of the 
                                                          
7 When evaluating if a potential voting right is currently exercisable, it is necessary to consider 
the date and the price of the exercise. If we are in the period in which the security can be 
exercised and if it is in the money, then it is currently exercisable.  
As an example, potential voting rights are not to be considered exercisable if cannot be 
exercised until a future date or until a future event does not occur. 
8 If the two closing dates are different, or if the economic principles adopted are not the same, 
the subsidiaries will prepare an additional annual report where they will provide the adjustments 
necessary to level out the differences with the parent’s balance sheet. 
Anyway, the distance between the two moments in which the balance sheets have been prepared 
cannot be longer than three months, and it will have to be the same over time. 
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parent and to the minority ones, even if this implies a negative balance for the non-controlling 
interests9 (Parbonetti, 2017). 
When determining its share of the profits, the parent will not consider any potential voting right 
that has not been exercised yet. In fact, the company must always represent the current 
shareholder structure, which will also reflect the effect of eventual purchases or sales of shares 
occurred after the obtaining of the control and that of eventual preferred shares issued by the 
entity and owned by minority investors. 
When the holding loses control over an investee, the consolidation must stop and any book 
value relative to that investee will be eliminated. 
When the loss of control occurs, the share must be accounted at its fair value following the IAS 
39, Financial instruments: recognition and measurement, or at its historical cost if it becomes 
a related or a jointly controlled entity (Toselli, 2013). 
 
1.4.4 Standing Interpretations Committee10 (SIC) 12: how to fill the gap of IAS 27 
The concept of control provided by the IAS 27 mainly refers to two possible alternative ways 
through which the parent may have power over an investee, and those are the owning of the 
majority of the shares and the actual ability to influence the activity of the entity (see paragraph 
1.4.2. Control: concept, valuation and loss). 
Such structure implied the presence of limits in this provision, which made it easy for 
companies to avoid consolidation of some entities, just by being sure that they owned only a 
minority of their shares, despite the actual exercise of control over them, and that there was no 
irrefutable proof of the existence of such control. 
                                                          
9 Any loss attributable to the minority shares that exceeds their stake of equity of the investee 
must be attributed the parent’s investors, for its exceeding part. This does not occur if such 
minority investors have the obligation to cover the losses with additional investments and they 
have the ability to do it. 
Such losses attributed to the parent will be covered by eventual future profits realized by the 
entity. 
10 The SIC are the interpretations of the standards issued by the IASB, and aimed at explaining 
the provisions and at resolving eventual doubts. 
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It is quite evident that the main problem regarded special purpose entities (SPE), which can be 
controlled also without the majority of the votes and for which it is quite difficult to show the 
involvement (Hewer, Davis, Haley, 2011). 
The special purpose entities are companies set up by a sponsor to accomplish a very specific 
and limited business activity. Those are structured entities11, in fact the voting rights are not 
relevant when determining who controls the entity. These are established with the specific aim 
of receiving cash flows from the sponsor and use them to repay their loans and provide equity 
to the investors. This transfer of assets allows the sponsor to monetize illiquid assets and to 
lower its cost of financing, but not its actual level of risk, since that it will have to provide 
financial support to the SPE whenever it will need it. 
In order to fill the gap left by the IAS 27 about investees like these, on November 1998 the 
IASB released the SIC 1212 which identifies additional indicators for the valuation of control, 
based on risks and rewards. 
The provision specifies that the parent must consolidate a SPE when the substance of the 
relation shows that it controls such entity. Moreover, in order to better explain the point, some 
examples of cases in which the consolidation must occur are provided, thus when: 
• The activities of the SPE are conducted on behalf of the entity, according to its needs, 
with the aim of providing it benefits; 
• Through an “autopilot” mechanism, the entity has the decision-making power to obtain 
the majority of the benefits; 
• The entity has the right to receive the majority of the benefits coming from the activities 
of the SPE and may be exposed to the relative risks; 
• The entity retains the majority of the risks related to the SPE. 
                                                          
11 A structured entity is “an entity that has been designed so that voting or similar rights are not 
the dominant factor in deciding who controls the entity, such as when any voting rights relate 
to administrative tasks only and the relevant activities are directed by means of contractual 
arrangements” (IFRS 12). 
Those entities have some recurring characteristics, such as the restricted activities, the narrow 
and well-defined objective, the little equity and the being financed by multiple contractually 
linked instruments. 
12 The provisions reported in this paragraph refer to the version of the interpretation provided 
by the European Union through the Regulation (EC) n. 1126/2008. 
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It might be possible to notice a problem about the relation between this interpretation and the 
standard to which it refers. In fact, differently from the IAS 27, which puts an emphasis on the 
actual ability to manage the operational and financial policies, the SIC 12 mainly refers to 
control as a consequence of the shared risks and rewards. 
Such contradiction was the main reason why the preparators of the consolidated annual reports 
did not actually took such provision as additional to the rules of IAS 27, but considered it as an 
alternative model of consolidation, independent from IAS 27. Because of that, groups started 
to adopt discretionally one or the other consolidation model, still leaving many entities out of 
the consolidation area. 
As this very last point allows us to notice, it is possible to see how, despite the great work made 
through the years to improve the rules about consolidation, the IAS 27 was leaving some empty 
spaces. Entities took advantage of these gaps to hide subsidiaries which would have worsen the 
image of their groups, lowering their assets and increasing their liabilities. 
 
 1.5 International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) 1013 
The main issues, coming from the provisions of IAS 27, about the concept of control and the 
consequent identification of the area of consolidation, and the divergence between IAS 27 and 
SIC 12 emerged especially during the Great recession (2007 – 2013). 
The reactions of companies to such macroeconomic event highlighted the lack of transparency 
of their annual reports. In fact, it happened that, differently from what could have been 
forecasted looking at the financial statements, companies were unable to face this unexpected 
crisis. This situation highlighted the need of improving the disclosure and the information 
provided by companies, with a special focus on the off-balance sheet vehicles which increased 
the risks faced by businesses14. 
 
                                                          
13 The provisions that will be reported in this paragraph refer to the first version of the IFRS 10, 
thus the one published in 2010 by the IASB.  
14 Whenever an amount is not represented adequately on the balance sheet, it misses the usual 
counterbalance between the liability and the asset, which allows to understand if and in which 
measure the company is able to face the risk connected to the liability. 
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Moreover, the ambiguity about the interpretation of the IAS 27 had created a legal vacuum 
which did not allow to identify which were the entities controlled by the holding in the most 
complicated cases. This concern allowed groups to hide some of their holdings, reducing even 
more the transparency of the annual reports. 
In order to solve these issues, on May 2011 the IASB published the consolidation package, a 
set of five interactive principles providing rules about how to account for related entities. Such 
collection included: 
1. IFRS 10 Consolidated financial statement; 
2. IFRS 11 Joint arrangements; 
3. IFRS 12 Disclosure of interests in other entities; 
4. IAS 27 Separate financial statement (amended); 
5. IAS 28 Investments in associates and joint ventures (amended). 
These standards allow to clarify which is the accounting treatment to provide for companies 
related by any kind of interconnection. 
In particular, if there it is an outright control, then it is necessary to consolidate the entity, 
applying the provisions reported by IFRS 10. 
Anyway, if such control is shared and not exclusive, thus if there is a joint arrangement, the 
companies will assess which kind of deal there is in order to apply the right principle. In fact, 
if there is a joint operation15, IFRS 11 will be applied and the company will prepare a separate 
annual report; if, instead, there is a joint venture16 it will be required the application of IAS 28 
and IFRS 11 about equity accounting17.  
                                                          
15 IFRS 11 defines a joint operation as a joint arrangement in which the parties involved have 
rights over the assets and obligations over the liabilities relative to the arrangement. 
16 IFRS 11 defines a joint venture as a joint arrangement in which the parties involved have 
rights on the net assets relative to the arrangement. 
17 The equity accounting, also known as equity method, is a particular consolidation method 
that substantially provides the same pieces of information given by the consolidation, but 
practically differs in the form. Considering that the investee does not lose its “personality” as a 
business, the objective is only that of showing the results of the investment made and the 
reasons why it has been done. 
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Actually, there might also not be any kind of control, but still it might exist a significant 
influence18. If this is the case, it will be applied the provisions regarding equity accounting 
displayed by IAS 28. 
In any of these cases, companies will provide information in compliance with the IFRS 12. 
Finally, despite the owning of the shares, there might be no relation at all with the investee. If 
it is the case, the participation will be accounted in compliance with the IFRS 9 Financial 
instruments, which disciplines the accounting of the financial instruments, and the company 
will be asked to disclose information in compliance with the IFRS 7 Financial instruments: 
disclosure.  
As the list shows, IAS 27 has not been completely deleted, in fact it still is applied to entities 
preparing the separate annual report. 
Reading the new IFRS 10, it is possible to observe that it provides a unique consolidation model, 
thus without making any difference between structured entities and other non-structured 
entities, differently from what happened with IAS 12 and SIC 12. This is due to the fact that 
the new standard replaces both provisions and refers to any kind of controlled entity. 
The consolidation package was introduced in the European Union through the Regulation (UE) 
n. 1254/2012 which provided its application, at the latest, for businesses periods starting from 
January 1st, 2014. 
The decision to provide such later application (the IASB, in fact, had established that these 
standards would have been applied to periods starting from January 1st, 2013) came from the 
results of the field-tests19 which pushed the European Financial Reporting Advisory Group 
(EFRAG)20, the Foundation for Economic Education (FEE) and the European Union (UE) to 
                                                          
18 IAS 28 identifies a situation of significant influence whenever an entity has power to 
participate to the decision process regarding the financial and operative policies, but does not 
have control over the investee. 
19 These tests were conducted by the EFRAG with the aim of obtaining, from the participating 
companies, a feedback on the possible issues arising from the implementation of the new 
standards and an estimate of the relative expected costs and benefits. 
20 Since 2001 the EFRAG, composed of professionals representing the accounting profession, 
has the task of providing technical expertise to the European Commission for what concerns 
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postpone their institution to let companies find all the information necessary for their correct 
application. 
 
 1.5.1 The transition from IAS 27 to IFRS 10 
The IASB provided that the IFRS 10 should have been applied to annual periods beginning 
after January 1st, 2013. An earlier application was allowed even if it was also required to declare 
it and to apply, at the same time, also the other standards that are part of the Consolidation 
package. 
The standard requires a retrospective application, as disciplined by IAS 8 Accounting policies, 
changes in accounting estimates and errors, and also provides the publication of comparative 
information referred to the year previous to the adoption of the new standard that allow to fully 
understand and evaluate such passage21. 
After its first publication, the standard was amended on June 2012, when it was provided the 
preparation of the comparative information only for the year previous to the first application of 
the standard. 
Despite the general rule about the retroactivity, some exceptions are provided. 
First of all, whenever the evaluation about control takes to a different outcome from the one 
obtained through the application of IAS 27, but a fully retrospective application is not possible. 
Another exception regards the case in which the outcome of the valuation in the two different 
scenarios is the same, but the date in which control has been lost or acquired is different. 
Thus, when applying this new standard for the first time, it may or not be necessary to make 
adjustments. 
No adjustment is required if the assessments coming from the application of IFRS 10 are the 
same that were obtained under IAS 27, which means that the investee continues to be (not to 
be) consolidated under the new standard. 
                                                          
the use of IAS in Europe, verifying whether those are in line with the other provisions or if 
adjustments are necessary. 
21
 This provision refers to the amendment published on June 2012 and applicable since January 
2013. This modification was also approved by the EU through the Regulation (UE) n. 313/2013. 
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If, instead, it happens that an entity which was not previously consolidated, has now to be 
consolidated, different scenarios may occur: 
• If the entity is a business, as defined by IFRS 3 Business combinations22, then it must 
measure its activities, liabilities and minority interests as if it had been consolidated 
since the date in which it was acquired (considering the definition of control provided 
by IFRS 10). 
If these measurements are not possible, the parent will apply the measures provided by 
IFRS 3 starting from the earliest possible period; 
• If the entity is not a business, still its activities, liabilities and minority interests will 
have to be measured as if them had been consolidated since the moment in which control 
was obtained. But, in this case, any difference between the value of these amounts 
previously recognized and their current value will be accounted as if it was the 
corresponding adjustment for the opening balance of equity. 
If these measurements are not possible, the parent will apply the acquisition method 
provided by the IFRS 3, without accounting for the goodwill. Also in this case the 
standard will be applied starting from the earliest possible period.  
Any difference between the amounts recognized at the deemed acquisition date and the relative 
value previously recognized because of the involvement with the entity, will be recognized as 
an adjustment to equity for that period. In addition to this, the investor will provide also all the 
information required by IAS 28. 
Another case is that in which the introduction of IFRS 10 causes a cessation of the consolidation 
of the investee. If this is the case, the interest in the entity will have to be accounted as if it was 
accounted in compliance with the new standard since the moment in which it was acquired. 
If this is not possible, the application of the standard should start in the earliest possible period. 
Also in this case, any difference between the amount accounted in this way and the value 
previously recognized will be accounted as an adjustment for the opening balance if the equity 
of that period. 
                                                          
22 “An integrated set of activities and assets that is capable of being conducted and managed for 
the purpose of providing a return in the form of dividends, lower costs or other economic 
benefits directly to investors or other owners, members or participants.” (IFRS 3, 2004). 
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Despite the case in which the accounting of the interest does not change, thus it continues to be 
(not to be) consolidated, any accounting difference can only be recognized starting from the 
moment in which the new standard is applied and not from a previous time. 
 
1.5.2 Presentation of the annual report and consolidation procedures 
Despite some great differences between the IAS 27 and the IFRS 10, there are several points in 
which the two standards are the same. 
First of all, the IFRS 10 identifies the same cases in which the parent can be exempted from 
consolidation (see paragraph 1.4.1 Presentation of the consolidated annual report), even if it 
also adds that its rules do not apply to post-employment benefit plans or other long-term 
employee benefit plans, being them disciplined by IAS 19 Employee benefits. 
The provisions regarding the consolidation procedures are not different from the ones provided 
by IAS 27. This implies that also IFRS 10 asks parent companies to write their consolidated 
annual reports by assembling, voice by voice, the balance sheets of all the companies of the 
group, eliminating the intragroup transactions, eliding the participation of the parent with the 
relative portion of equity of the investee and highlighting separately the interests of the other 
investors. 
This has to be done since the date in which the investor obtains control, and until such control 
is lost. 
Moreover, when making the necessary evaluations, the investor will only consider the actual 
shareholder structure, without taking into account the potential voting rights, unless those give 
access to the returns connected to the propriety (like the perception of dividends). 
Also with this new standard, it is provided that all the annual reports considered have to be 
prepared applying the same accounting principles and will have to refer to the same closing 
date, providing specific adjustments otherwise.  
Finally, all the annual reports used for the preparation of the consolidated one must be drafted 
in the same currency. If this is not the case and conversions are needed, the relative 
consequences must be reported, in compliance with IAS 21 The effects of changes in foreign 
exchange rates. 
Also with the new standard, the parent may lose control over the investee in many ways, such 
as the sale of its shares, the conclusion of the agreement that gave it rights or the intervention 
of the government. As provided by IAS 27, if such loss occurs, it is asked to derecognize the 
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relative assets and liabilities from the consolidated financial statement, to recognize any 
eventual retained investment in the entity at its fair value and to recognize eventual gains and 
losses attributable to the amounts that were previously accounted for in the other comprehensive 
income. 
 
 1.5.3 A new concept of control: definition and assessment 
Similarly to IAS 27, the IFRS 10 establishes the principles that entities controlling one or more 
subsidiaries must follow when preparing and presenting the consolidated financial statement. 
In order to do this, it defines the concept of control, being it the only basis for the definition of 
the entities to be consolidated. 
Parents are required to verify whether they control an entity regardless of the nature of the 
involvement with it, to reassess whether they still control or not a company whenever one of 
the elements indicating the subsistence of control change (even if they are not directly involved) 
and to apply these concepts to any case, such as those in which it owns the majority, or less, of 
the voting rights, those involving agency relationships and those in which the investor only 
controls a portion of the assets of the investee. 
The new standard establishes that “an investor controls an investee when it is exposed, or as 
rights, to variable returns from its involvement with the investee and has the ability to affect 
those returns through its power over the investee. Thus, the principle of control sets out the 
following three elements of control: 
1. Power over the investee; 
2. Exposure, or rights, to variable returns from involvement with the investee; and 
3. The ability to use power over the investee to affect the amount of the investor’s returns.” 
An investor is considered to have power over an investee whenever it has rights that give it the 
ability to direct the relevant activities of the entity, no matter whether it is exercising such rights 
or not.  
Such assessments may be straightforward, as in the case in which the power is given by the 
voting rights, or more complex as in the case in which voting rights have no relevance and 
power comes from contractual rights. The standard, in fact, provides some examples of sources 
of power different from voting rights, specifying that it may come from contractual 
arrangements between the investor and other vote holders which would give it the faculty of 
exercising voting rights sufficient to let it exercise the power, other contractual arrangements, 
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potential voting rights, percentage of shares owned and dispersion of other quotes or from a 
combination of these options. Moreover, even in absence of voting rights, the investor may be 
able to approve the appointment of the main members of the management team, or may affect 
the entrance of the entity in a deal that may favor itself. Naturally not all the special relations 
that the investor may have with the entity imply the existence of control, but those seeing a 
financial dependence or the involvement of managerial figures may suggest the subsistence of 
power.   
Anyway, when the investor does not hold the majority of the voting rights23, and it is necessary 
to understand if those rights that it owns are sufficient to give it power, it is necessary to 
evaluate: 
1. The relative size of the investor’s voting rights compared to that of other investors and 
the dispersion of the other voting rights24; 
2. Potential voting rights held by the investor and by other investors25; 
3. Rights arising from contractual arrangements; 
4. Other facts and circumstances which suggest that the investor has the current ability to 
direct relevant activities. 
                                                          
23 Or when its voting rights, even being the majority, are not substantive (see paragraph 1.5.4 
Substantive rights: the element necessary for the conferment of power). 
24 The bigger the relative size, the higher the probability that the investor has power. Similarly, 
the more the investors that need to cooperate to outvote the investor, the higher the probability 
that such investor has power. 
25 Potential voting rights arise from convertible instruments, or options. The parent is required 
to evaluate the actual possibility to exercise them, because those may be determining in 
assessing which investor exercises power. When making these valuations, it is necessary to 
consider their purpose and design, which means determining terms and conditions, evaluating 
any possible consideration that might be made by the investor about it (which eventually means 
distinguishing between significantly and slightly out of the money), their combination with 
other rights held by the investor and the possibility to exercise them when it comes the moment 
to take decisions about the relevant activities. 
Also these rights, to be considered, need to be substantive (see paragraph 1.5.4 Substantive 
rights: the element necessary for the conferment of power). 
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Even if it may appear obvious that an investor holding the majority of the voting rights is 
controlling the investee, it is not always the case. It may happen, in fact, that its power is limited 
because of the involvement of the State, of an administrator or of a regulator. On the other hand, 
it cannot either be directly assumed that, in these cases, an investor holding the majority of the 
voting rights does not have power: additional inquiries are necessary. 
It may also happen that more than one investor has the ability to direct such relevant activities. 
If this is the case, the investor that directs the ones that affect the most the returns of the entity 
is considered to have power. 
Being aware of the possibility that such indications about control may not be sufficient to 
understand whether an entity has it or not, the IASB has also provided a guidance referred to: 
the proof of the eventual power, the indicators of the eventual power and the incentives to obtain 
power. This is aimed at facilitating the assessment of control, since that the holding is provided 
with a list of the factors to be checked. 
Before moving on with the other requisites, it is important to focus on the introduction of the 
new concept of relevant activities to which the standard refers for the identification of control 
and that are defined as the “activities of the investee that significantly affect the investee’s 
returns” (IFRS 10). 
In the most complicated cases, as those in which voting rights do not allow to manage relevant 
activities, such identification may be harder. In order to solve this problem, the standard 
suggests analyzing the purpose and design of the entity. This means considering “the 
involvement and decisions made at the investee’s inception as part of its design and evaluate 
whether the transaction terms and features of the involvement provide the investor with rights 
that are sufficient to give it power” (IFRS 10). Through this analysis it will be possible to 
identify such relevant activities, how the decision-making process is structured, who can affect 
it and which is the subject that benefits of the returns coming from such decisions. Especially 
in cases where power is not exercised though voting rights, this analysis will let the investor 
identify which are the risks faced by the entity, how and which of them can be passed to third 
parties and whether it is affected by them. It will also permit to understand if the potential rights 
are substantive and whether a decision maker is an agent or a principal26. 
In fact, if in the case of ordinary entities, the relevant activities are generally those connected 
to financial and operating policies, in the case of structured entities the identification of these 
activities is harder. Such businesses have few and pre-determined activities that depend on the 
                                                          
26 These two points will be properly explained in the next paragraphs. 
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reason why the company was set up, and this implies that the ability to express an opinion, and 
thus to affect relevant activities, is mainly granted by the contractual rights (Acernese, 2015). 
To further facilitate the identification of such relevant activities, and the job of those defining 
the consolidation area, the IFRS 10 also presents some examples of those activities: 
• Activities related to the determination of the financial and managerial policies; 
• Nomination, withdrawal and definition of the management’s retributive policies; 
• Direction of purchases and sales of goods and services; 
• Management of financial policies and resources; 
• Acquisition, selection and management of the operating assets; 
• Management of the research and development activities, 
• Determination of the funding structure. 
One of the possible issues regarding the definition of the controller of a company may regard 
the case in which we have a franchising. In this condition, in fact, the nature of the deal imposes 
that the franchisor can take decisions regarding the actions connected to the arrangement. 
Anyway, such power is limited to these activities, which means that if another investor has the 
power to take decisions about the relevant activities of the entity, then no power can be 
attributed to the franchisor, also because its returns would be affected by the decisions of this 
other investor. 
In any case, when assessing the power of the franchisor, it is better to remind that the less the 
financial support that it provides, the less the power that it can exercise, thus the less the 
possibility that it controls the franchisee.  
An investor is considered to be exposed to the variable returns of an investee whenever such 
returns vary as a consequence of the performance of the entity. It is important to notice that the 
standard refers to “returns” meaning that the parent needs to consider both positive and negative 
results coming from the involvement with the subsidiary. When making this assessment, the 
investor evaluates the measure of such variability considering the substance of the returns, not 
their legal form. 
The standard suggests considering, as returns, amounts as dividends, compensations for 
services, taxes and exposition to losses, fiscal benefits, the future access to the liquidity coming 
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It is quite obvious that once an investor is largely exposed to these variable returns, it tries to 
obtain as much power as possible to affect them. Thus, such exposition may be an indicator, 
especially in the hardest situations, to understand where control lies. 
The last element necessary to identify control is the link between power and returns. 
Specifically there is control whenever an investor has the ability to use its power to influence 
the returns coming from its involvement with the investee (Cordova, 2017). 
Thus, in order to assess control, after having identified all its subordinated entities, the parent 
will understand whether it owns, wholly or partially, such business and if it is exposed to the 
variable returns. Then it will identify which are the relevant activities of the investee, how the 
relative decisions are taken and which are the rights that give the current ability to be involved 
in such decision making. Finally, it will understand if it has such rights, and if it can use them 
as a principal to affect its own returns. 
 
 1.5.4 Substantive rights: the element necessary for the conferment of power 
One of the elements on which the standard mainly focuses when providing how to assess power, 
is the substantiality of rights.  The IFRS 10, in fact, specifies that for a right to be considered as 
a source of power (and, consequently, control), it must be a substantive right which means that 
the investor must have the practical ability to exercise it when decisions have to be taken27. 
There may be many obstacles preventing the investor from the ability to exercise its right. Those 
may be of any kind, financial, operational or legal, the investor may also miss information that 
would be necessary to the exercise, or it might be the case that, for the right to be exercised, it 
is necessary the approval of many people. Among the others, it will be taken into account the 
exercise price, the financial ability to exercise the right and the exercise period.  
It will be also important to consider substantive rights of other investors, since that those may 
be used to prevent others from the exercise of their rights. On the other hand, the more the 
people that are necessary to approve the possibility of exercise the right, the less the probability 
that it is a substantive right (Dello Strologo, 2011). 
                                                          
27 Here the standard refers to any kind of right which can be considered when assessing power. 
This implies that these assessments are needed also when analyzing voting rights since that also 
them could not be exercised when taking decisions about relevant activities.  
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A category of rights that surely cannot be defined as substantive is that of the protective rights. 
Those are rights that are only designed to protect an investor, when the activities of the investee 
are subject to significant changes because of extraordinary events, and the investment may be 
affected by that. Being like this, these rights do not give any power to their holder, nor to affect 
the relevant activities or to prevent another investor from doing something. 
Also in this case, the standard provides examples of this type of rights (Bianchi, 2014): 
• The creditor’s right to limit the debtor in activities which may be detrimental for the 
assets of the entity; 
• The minority shares’ right to approve investments that overgo specific thresholds, the 
issuing and the repurchase of equity or debt instruments; 
• The creditor’s right to exclusively assault the debtor’s equity in case of non-compliance 
with the payments; 
• The minority's right to approve the putting in liquidation, the modifications of the statute 
and the pricing of the transactions with correlated parties. 
Naturally, when assessing whether its rights are substantive or merely protective, the investor 
cannot simply consider that any right which can only be exercised in extraordinary conditions 
is a protective right. It may happen, in fact, that an entity is designed in such a way that all its 
relevant activities are predetermined and, when specific circumstances occur, it is necessary to 
take decisions about the actions to be done. The rights that the investor would exercise in such 
cases would not be merely protective. 
 
 1.5.5 Agency relationships: when the decision maker does not have power 
In the valuation process about its power over an investee, the investor with decision-making 
rights needs to understand whether it is a principal or an agent. 
An agent is a decision maker that acts on behalf of another party, the principal. Because of that, 
when exercising its decision-making authority, it is not controlling the entity. 
Once that this  point is clear, in the evaluation process of control, the investor will consider 
eventual delegated decision-making rights as if it was holding them directly.  
Understanding whether a decision maker is a principal or an agent is not as straightforward as 
it may seem. The fact that others may benefit of the decisions taken and the oblige to act in 
someone else better interests, are not elements that, alone, can allow the identification of an 
agent. Because of these eventual issues, the standard provides a guidance for investors 
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analyzing their position. In particular, the following factors must be taken into account, still 
heeding that whenever a party holds a substantive right to remove the decision maker, even 
without cause, the decision maker does not have any power: 
1. The scope of the decision-making authority. 
This implies considering the activities that it can perform, in particular taking into 
account the agreement to which it refers and its discretion when taking decisions. 
It is better to consider also the purpose and design of the investee, in order to assess 
correctly the risks to which the decision maker is exposed and the way in which those 
may be passed to other parties; 
2. The rights held by other parties. 
Substantive rights held by other parties may restrict the authority of the decision maker 
or may even allow its removal. When those are held by just one party, this element, even 
in isolation, implies that the decision-maker is an agent. Differently, if those rights are 
held by more than one party, a deeper analysis is necessary, still keeping in mind that 
the more the parties that should exercise their rights to affect the power of the investor, 
the more the probability that it is a principal; 
3. Its remuneration. 
The investor shall consider that the greater its exposure to the variable returns coming 
from the activities of the investee, the higher the probability that it is a principal. 
It should also consider whether its remuneration is commensurate to the service 
provided and if the remuneration agreement presents terms and conditions that are 
typical of an agent-principal agreement; 
4. Its exposure to variability of returns from other interests. 
Finally, the investor shall consider the magnitude and the variability associated with 
other interests that it holds in the entity, and whether those may affect its actions. The 
greater this exposure is, the higher the probability that such investor is a principal. 
It might also happen that a party is an agent also if no agreement exists. It is the case of a de 
facto agent, which is a party that is pushed to act on the investor’s behalf. 
These situations can be identified considering the nature of the relation between the party and 
the investor and their interaction.  
Such assessments are necessary whenever there are changes in the overall relationship among 
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 1.5.6 Silos: when the investor only controls specified assets 
There are cases in which, even when the company holds only some assets of the investee, still 
it must proceed with their consolidation. This is what happens when these assets are such that 
can be considered to constitute a separate entity, which is when those are the only source of 
payment for specified liabilities and any other party, different from those involved with these 
specified liabilities, cannot claim any right on these assets.  
From a technical point of view, such portion of assets, liabilities and equity is ring-fenced from 
the rest of the business and represents a separate entity that is named as silo. 
Once that this particular condition is defined, the investor must understand how the decisions 
about the relevant activities of the silo are taken and whether its rights give it the possibility to 
be involved in such decision-making process. 
If this is the case and the investor controls the silo, it must proceed with the consolidation of 
this portion of the entity. 
Other eventual investors controlling the remaining portion of the entity will consolidate it, 
excluding the assets, liabilities and equity referable to the silo. 
 
 1.5.7 Investment entities: the only case of a parent exempted from consolidation28 
On October, 2012 the IASB published an amendment to the IFRS 10, providing an exception 
from consolidation for the investment entities, because of the low relevance of the 
informativeness connected to these businesses.   
The standard defines as investment entity all those businesses that: 
1. Obtain funds from investors to provide them with managerial services; 
2. Commit to its investors that the only scope of their activity is that of investing to obtain 
an equity return; 
3. Measure and value the performance of their investments at fair value. 
Generally those entities have more than one investment and more than one investor.  
 
                                                          
28 The provisions illustrated in this paragraph have not been homologated yet by the EU. 
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It is quite evident that the reason why those entities buy shares of other companies is that of 
obtaining positive returns, thus not that of controlling them. This causes the absence of the 
unitary direction that is typical of a group and, because of this, the new standard provides an 
exception from the consolidation requirements for those entities. 
It is established that the accounting of the investments held by these companies must be made 
in compliance with the IFRS 9 Financial instruments, and thus at fair value through profit and 
loss. 
Considering the great relevance of this exception, it is very important to assess correctly 
whether a company is or not an investment entity. In order to this, first it will be checked if the 
requirements are met, then if the common elements are there and, finally, additional analyses 
will be made to confirm the results obtained. 
Actually, an entity may be an investment one even if it held only one investment or if it only 
had one investor (it may be at the beginning of its activity), if the investors were correlated 
parties that have established a parallel fund to finance these investments and if the investors 
were not owning equity instruments, but debt instruments, whose reimbursement was subject 
to the fair value variations. Moreover, considering the reason why investments are made, their 
life should be predetermined and the entity should provide ways out for them. Anyway, even if 
the absence of the common characteristics does not prevent an entity from being defined as an 
investment one, in these cases the standard requires a higher disclosure for the identification of 
the entity (Grant Thornton, 2017). 
 
 1.6 A comparison between old and new: how consolidation has changed 
The presentation of the two standards and the relative explanations allow to start to understand 
which are the similarities and the differences between the two of them, but in this paragraph it 
will be provided a deeper and full analysis of these dissimilarities. 
 
 1.6.1 Same issue, different definitions: what is a consolidated annual report 
These two principles discipline the same issue, that is the preparation of the consolidated annual 
report, but the two face this deal in different ways, starting from defining differently what a 
consolidated annual report is. 
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The IAS 27 defined this document as the annual report of a group presented as if it was the 
annual report of a single economic entity. 
Differently, the IFRS 10 defines it as “The financial statement of a group in which the assets, 
liabilities, equity, income, expenses and cash flows of the parent and its subsidiaries are 
presented as those of a single economic entity". 
It is already possible to highlight a deeper and more precise approach of the latest standard, 
which will then come to leave less space for misunderstandings. 
 
 1.6.2 When and how the parent must consolidate: similarities and differences 
The two standards do not differ that much in the provisions about when an entity should 
consolidate or should be exempted from this oblige. In fact both provide that the holding does 
not have to consolidate when it is not listed, nor about to be listed, when the parent is itself the 
subsidiary of another entity that is already preparing the consolidated financial statement, or 
when the controlling entity is preparing an annual report that is compliant to the IFRS’ 
provisions29. Similarly, both standards provide the same consolidation procedures. 
Despite this, it is possible to identify a difference about the exemptions provided for the 
consolidation. In fact, both IAS 27 and IFRS 10 provide that a sub-holding can choose to not 
consolidate but it is only IAS 27 that allows the exemption also to these entities that, even 
holding the majority of the voting rights, are not actually controlling the investee. 
On the other hand, it is only the newest standard which gives to investment entities the 
possibility to not consolidate its investees. The issue regarding those businesses was not 
considered at all by the previous regulation, thus it is a new entry in the consolidation world. 
The IASB, in fact, has considered that the investments of those entities cannot be considered to 
fall in the consolidation concept, since that are acquired only for the obtainment of positive 
returns.  
 
                                                          
29
 In both cases, it is necessary to remember that the final word about these dispositions is the 
one carried by the national and EU provisions, which requires at least (each country can extend 
the oblige to other parents) to holdings being or controlling capital companies or to entities 
being particular legal entities to prepare the consolidated financial statement.  
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Once that the parent has defined the consolidation area, both standards require the application 
of the acquisition method for the consolidation procedures. 
This implies that the accounting values of the subsidiary must be accounted at the fair value at 
the date in which control is acquired, meanwhile the parent will account for goodwill applying 
the rules provided by IFRS 3 Business combinations. 
 
 1.6.3 Different concepts of control 
As already explained, the main reason why it came out the necessity to issue a new standard 
about consolidation was connected to the different interpretations about the rules to define the 
consolidation area due to the gaps left by IAS 27.  
First of all, it is important to notice that the old standard did not give any definition of control, 
but just explained which were the situations in which it was supposed to exist. 
Differently, the new standard first defines what control is and then identifies the guide lines to 
delimit the consolidation area. 
The old standard identified control in every case in which the company held the majority of the 
voting rights or in those in which, even holding less than the majority, still it was exercising 
control, considered its involvement in the investee. 
Differently, the new standard provides a broader concept of control, defining it as every 
condition in which the investor is subject to the variable returns of the investee and has rights 
which give it the possibility to take decisions about the relevant activities of the entity, thus 
influencing such returns. 
The IAS 27 mainly focused on the de jure control, without establishing proper rules for those 
cases in which the parent exercised control through the owning of less than the majority of the 
voting rights. Because of this approach, it came out a series of different interpretations about 
the de facto control and, as a consequence, companies being in the same situation applied 
different accounting approaches, thus producing annual reports that could not be compared.  
Because of these issues and because of the failure of the clarifying disposition amended in 2005, 
the IASB decided to focus more on the de facto control through the IFRS 10, thus considering 
all the cases in which control is exercised, no matter if through the owning of more or less than 
the majority of the voting rights. It is not supposed anymore that the owning of the majority of 
the voting rights implies the exercise of control over the investee, because there is a higher 
focus on the substance rather than on the form. The standard, in fact, requires verifying the 
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subsistence of the control also in cases in which the investor holds less than the majority of the 
voting rights, considering also the size of its shares compared to that of the other investors, and 
the level of dispersion of the other ownings, the substantive potential voting rights and those 
rights coming from contractual agreements.  This approach also allows a higher level of 
comparability, since that there are more specific rules about how to define the consolidation 
area, and this leaves less space for subjective interpretations. 
Moreover, IAS 27 identified control only connecting it to cases in which the holding was 
obtaining benefits from the subsidiary. In a totally different way, IFRS 10 defines control 
referring to the possibility of the investor to obtain returns from its investee, thus without 
focusing only on positive returns but including both positive and negative outcomes of the 
activity of the entity.  
The wider definition provided by the IFRS 10 allows to take into account all the situations in 
which control is exercised, from the easiest to the toughest to assess. Being more generic, the 
new standard is able to identify every condition in which control is exercised and does not leave 
much room for loopholes. In this way, entities should have less opportunities to avoid 
consolidation and this should take to more transparent annual reports. 
It also misses a distinction between common investees and special purpose entities, that were 
previously disciplined separately by the IAS 27 and the SIC 12. The principle proposes a unique 
set of rules, for all investees, thus not leaving any space for misunderstandings and ambiguous 
interpretations by the users which may leave such entities out of the consolidation area, 
providing wrong information to the readers. 
In this way, the latest provision offers a unique model for the preparation of the consolidated 
financial statement, through the establishment of clear and unambiguous rules for the detection 
of the de facto control, and eliminating the inconsistencies due to the different interpretations 
(before coming from the inconsistencies between IAS 27 and SIC 12).  
One of the concepts introduced by the IFRS 10 for the correct identification of the consolidation 
area is that of the relevant activities. 
Actually this concept should not be considered completely new. It is possible to find a similar 
idea in the IAS 27, when it is provided that investors managing the financial and operating 
policies have to be considered as having control over the entity. But also in this case, the new 
provision expands the concept, now including all the activities that have a significant impact 
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 1.6.4 Different approaches to rights: when those can give control 
Among the elements that both standards take into account when providing guidelines for the 
identification of the consolidation area there are the potential rights. As already explained, those 
are rights owned by the investor that, if exercised, can give it more power and that eventually 
may give control to an investor which would not have power over the entity without them. 
But, despite the apparent similarity, the two standards have a different approach to these rights. 
IAS 27, in fact, considers that potential rights have to be considered only when being currently 
exercisable. Differently, the new standard is more focused on the substantiality of the right, 
evaluating whether it can be exercised when it is required to take decisions about the relevant 
activities.  
It may happen, in fact, that a right being currently exercisable cannot be exercised by the 
investor in the moment in which a decision must be taken, thus control would be wrongly 
attributed. It is possible to understand the difference only when additional elements are 
considered, for example looking for eventual barriers to the exercise or for disincentive clauses. 
The previous standard did not either allow the possibility to consider the financial ability of the 
investor, thing that is now provided by the IFRS 10 when evaluating the exercisability of the 
potential rights (Rizzi, 2013).  
It is even true that, despite the higher adherence to the reality, these new rules may be harder to 
apply because of the necessity to know more about the circumstances around the investors and 
other investors’ rights. Moreover, the new provisions also require higher subjectivity which 
may undermine the truthfulness of the annual reports. 
The second requirement presented by the IFRS 10 for rights to be considered when assessing 
control is that of their substantiality. The latest standard, in fact, considers only substantive 
rights as providers of control. 
This is a requisite completely new for the consolidation provisions. The previous standard, in 
fact, did not wonder whether rights held by the investor were actually exercisable, but just cared 







 ~ 40 ~      
 
 1.6.5 Disciplining consolidation through the definition of new concepts 
The IFRS 10 faces the concept of consolidation, starting from what had been disciplined by the 
IAS 27, but then improving some concepts or even introducing new notions that allow to better 
define the relations among the investor and its investees.  
One of the new ideas that the latest standard has introduced is that of the agency relations, 
which are introduced, explained and disciplined. This is an issue that was not absolutely 
considered by the previous principle that, in this way, was leaving a further empty space that 
gave more room to parents trying to avoid consolidation or to hide the reality. 
Among the others, the new principle introduces also the concept of silo, whose consolidation 
was not provided before. 
 
 1.7 From theory to reality: the reaction of companies to the new standard 
As it has been possible to observe, over the years regulators have been trying to provide a 
faithful accounting representation of what a group is. They have been doing this also by 
recurring at different theories that try to explain this concept from different points of view. They 
had at their disposal the proprietary theory, with a specific focus on what the parent actually 
owns; the parent theory, that tries to give its attention to both, what the parent holds and what 
it controls, counterbalancing the need to show the parent’s result and that of understanding what 
is happening at a group level; the entity theory, that considers the whole entity without any 
distinction between what is possessed by the holding and what by the minority investors, 
looking at the group as an unicum; and the modified parent theory30 which stands on the same 
concept of the entity theory, but requires the holding to only recognize its own goodwill 
(Grasso, Terazzi, 2009). As it is possible to understand, choosing one or the other path, would 
have lead regulators to different representations of these groups. 
After having wondered which would have been the best way to deal with this issue, through the 
IAS 27, the IASB had tried to provide a concept of control which was wider than the one 
proposed by the proprietary theory, and that was more oriented toward the parent theory, 
focusing on the power that the holding could exercise on its subsidiaries. The first analyses 
showed that such approach carried good results, especially for those groups with a simple 
                                                          
30 These theories are introduced and explained in the IFRS 3. 
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shareholder structure. The standard was shaped in such a way that companies were obliged to 
consolidate only when those were owning the majority of the voting rights. As a consequence 
of this provision, it was very easy to not consolidate investees which they could control even 
without having such amount of shares, as in the case of special purpose entities. 
After having understood such issue, the IASB tried to solve it by publishing the SIC 12, which 
required companies to consolidate those entities whose risks and returns it was exposed to. The 
problem was that holdings took these provisions as an alternative consolidation model, such 
that they ended up choosing, for the preparation of their consolidated financial statement, what 
was required by IAS 27 or by SIC 12 (when, instead, they should have applied the two of them 
contemporaneously). 
The final (at least until this moment) solution to these problems came in 2011, with the IFRS 
10, especially because of the Great Recession which highlighted the huge lack of transparency 
of many consolidated financial statements. Such standard provides the adoption of a step by 
step approach for the definition of the consolidation area, and has a wider field of application. 
It also offers a guide with detailed rules and examples which are aimed at easing the job of the 
preparators of the consolidated annual reports. The idea is that, in this way, businesses have 
less room for subjective evaluations and the consolidation area is actually adherent to the 
reality. 
At this point, considering the necessity to assess the honesty of groups, from which it comes 
the truthfulness of the consolidated financial statements that they prepare, it is interesting to 
understand how parents have actually reacted to these new rules. 
On the other hand, it is also important to have an objective analysis of the new standard, aimed 
at testing its power. It is not possible to forget, in fact, that the first problem to be solved to not 
leave room for misinterpretations is the ability of the regulation to rule adequately the situation. 
 
 1.7.1 Proving the efficiency of the new standard: Shapley – Shubik and Bazhaf indexes 
In order to obtain a more critic view about the new standard, it is possible to test the 
effectiveness of its rules through the adoption of the Shapley-Shubik and Bazhaf indexes (Ben-
Shahar, Sulganik, Tsang 2016). 
As already highlighted, the main issue of these consolidation principles, regards their ability to 
identify which are the investees over which the investor can actually exercise its power. 
Those indexes measure the actual power that a voter is able to exercise in a voting system and, 
because of that, those may not be the most proper tools to measure the power of the new IFRS. 
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That is because, as the principle itself emphasizes, control does not necessarily come from 
voting rights, thus the instruments proposed should be considered as an approximative measure 
of the ability of the IFRS 10 to correctly define the consolidation area. 
Stated this, it is yet interesting to take into account the doubts arising from the results obtained 
from this analysis. It appears, in fact, that the standard concludes for the absence of control 
where, instead, the indexes identify it. 
It may be interesting to conduct further analyses to understand whether those conclusions bring 
to light an actual problem or if, instead, these doubts have no reason to exist. 
 
 1.7.2 Applying the standard: expected and actual consequences 
After having released the new rules, the IASB had stated that it expected no consistent changes 
in the consolidated financial statements that companies would have published from that 
moment on. However, it might also have been possible that the performance of groups would 
have gotten worse, since that there might have been an extension of the consolidation area, 
which might have included bad companies that had not reacted well to the recent economic 
crisis. Despite this, Lopes and Lopes (2019), have proven that the IASB’s provisions were right. 
Apart from the natural and small modification of the consolidation area (new companies entered 
into this perimeter and others, previously being within it, exited it), in fact, it was not possible 
to identify relevant variations in the financial and economical indexes of the groups. 
The only relevant observation was the one regarding the consolidation of the SPEs, that had 
registered a relevant change, which was something quite predictable considering the duality 
between IAS 27 and SIC 12. 
Above this, companies were also asked to provide their opinion about the new principle through 
the Field Test. 
The only downside that came out from this analysis was the difficulty that preparators met while 
finding the information necessary to understand which companies should have been within the 
consolidation area. 
Despite that, the new standard was positively accepted, thanks to the higher level of clarity 
compared to the previous regulation, the introduction of one single consolidation model and the 
possibility to collect more information about the contractual arrangements, and the consequent 
risks, among companies (EFRAG, 2012). 
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If only those in-depth analyses were taken into account, it would be possible to conclude that, 
despite the eventual doubts relative to the new standard, it is actually able to erase any 
possibility of finding tricks to avoid consolidation. But it is not either possible to forget about 
the propensity to the lie of some companies, which pushes toward further researches. 
 
 1.7.3 Over the rules: resistance 
The main reason why companies had been exploiting the gaps left by the IAS 27 is that they 
have an incentive to lie about the investees that they actually control, since that those can be 
used to hide liabilities. In particular, once that a business does not fall within the consolidation 
area, it can be used as a bucket where to shift undesired liabilities. In this way it seems that the 
group is good at managing its activities and liabilities, being the latter adequately (or even more 
than what would be enough) counterbalanced, and the general activity sustainable. As a 
consequence, this allows getting better rates and more favorable financing deals (those being 
more convenient and more flexible). On the other hand, as already noticed, lying about the 
actual composition of the group, also gives more space for the earning management, which 
allows to inflate the income.  
It is because of this reason that it is interesting to understand if holdings have still been trying 
to find loopholes also after the introduction of the IFRS 10 (Maroun, van Zijl 2016). 
The main problem that the new standard had to solve was the reduction, or even the elimination, 
of every possibility to avoid consolidation. Despite the new structure, and the reduction of the 
room for preparators’ judgment, the users interviewed have highlighted that they could still find 
loopholes to not include in their consolidated financial reports some of their subsidiaries. It is 
possible to see how users present what the authors identify as resistance, that is the attempt to 
find a way to get around consolidation. This is what may let think that even the new provisions 
are not enough to properly delimitate the consolidation area. 
The main concern for those dishonest preparators is that of understanding which is the legal 
interpretation to be given to the IFRS 10 in order to avoid the consolidation of subsidiaries, 
especially of SPEs. Obviously it is not possible to simply exclude a subsidiary from the 
consolidation area, even just because of the pressures that would be exercised by investors or 
by the audit committee, but yet it is possible to find a way to disregard it, apparently following 
the rules provided by the standard. Such resistance may be implemented, for example, by 
finding even the smallest and most irrelevant dissimilarities between the explanatory cases 
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provided by the IFRS 10, and the actual situation of the group, or by trying to prove that there 
is no exposition to the variable returns of a particular investee since that those are perfectly 
hedged through specific financial derivatives. 
The possibility to find such loopholes is a natural consequence of the fact that the standard is 
based on rules, rather than on principles, and this makes harder for it to perfectly fit on all of 
the possible complicated transactions that companies may put in place. On the other hand, it 
would not either be good to follow a principle-based approach, since that, despite its flexibility 
and its adaptation to every possible deal, it would be subject to individual interpretations and 
manipulations led by the specific incentives of the preparators. As a consequence, those annual 
reports would be difficult to be compared (Psaros, 2007). 
 
 1.7.4 A further look at what has been going on 
The analyses that have been proposed until this moment open the way to new questions 
regarding the introduction of the IFRS 10 and the way in which companies have dealt with it. 
Among the others, it may be possible to wonder how it is possible that the size of the groups 
has not consistently changed, considering their continuous attempt to find loopholes that allow 
to consolidate as little subsidiaries as possible. 
Parents, in fact, might have found the escapes they were looking for. This might have given 
them the possibility to apparently leave unchanged, or almost unchanged, the dimensions of the 
groups. 
On the other hand, they might have not found such loopholes. This might have implied another 
reaction, that requires analyses deeper than the ones that stop at the “appearance”, and that only 
focus on the sizes of the groups. Parents, in fact, might have understood to not be able to manage 
adequately groups that might have enlarged, and thus they might have directly chosen to dismiss 
some of their participations, rather than running the risk of consolidating other entities. 
Having understood to not be able to hide their subsidiaries anymore, they might have chosen to 
divest entities that were controlled through little shares and that now, considering the new rules, 
should have been consolidated. 
In the following chapters it will be developed an analysis aimed at answering these questions 
and at trying to understand as much as possible what has been going on after the introduction 
of the new rules. 
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This may be a step useful for the understanding of the ability of this new standard to completely 
transform the black sheep in white ones, eliminating all the possible escapes that they could 
use. 
 
 Chapter Two 
 




UNDERSTANDING THE BEHAVIOR OF GROUPS: THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE ANALYSIS 
 
2.1 How to build an analysis that properly answers our question 
In the first chapter, is has been possible to have a foretaste of how complex the behavior of 
groups can be. They, in fact, may be pushed by good or bad purposes. In the first case, they will 
follow properly the guidelines provided by the economic principles, representing in the most 
realistic possible way their condition. In the second case, they will try to manipulate the rules, 
in order to shape their actual economic situation for their scopes, presenting a better, even if 
fake, image of what they are (Maroun, van Zijl 2016). 
The main issue, when analyzing groups, is that it is not so easy to understand whether they are 
honest or not, because those manipulations that they may put in place are well hidden, such that 
apparently it seems that they are following what the standard requires. It is because of this 
reason, that whenever there is the attempt to understand what is actually going on with them, it 
is important to find a way to develop an analysis that does not stop at the appearances, but goes 
further, trying to reach the hearth of the truth. 
It is starting from this reasoning, that it may be possible to understand what may be wrong with 
the analysis, previously illustrated31, which evaluates the possible effects of the new rules, 
looking at the variations of the groups’ size after the introduction of the IFRS 10 (Lopes, Lopes 
2019). This research, in fact, may be superficial considering how cunning groups can be. This 
doubt becomes even stronger when considering the resistance that they generally put in place 
when adopting new principles, especially when those are not convenient for their interests 
(Maroun, van Zijl 2016). 
Considering those facts, it arises the necessity to find other ways to understand whether and, 
eventually, how groups have changed their attitude after the introduction of the consolidation 
package. 
                                                          
31 Look at paragraph 1.7.2 Applying the standard: expected and actual consequences. 
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It is a question for which it is not so straightforward to build an analysis that provides an answer, 
because there is the necessity to find the quantitative representation of a qualitative issue, that 
is the behavior of groups. In particular, it is necessary to understand which is that quantity that 
describes such attitude and that, meanwhile, is not affected by eventual manipulations. 
On the other hand, the construction of the linear regression that will describe the analysis, 
presents also other issues. Among the others, in fact, it is not possible to forget the identification 
of a proper sample and the individuation of adequate control variables. 
Considered all these points, it follows an explanation of the way in which the research presented 
in this work has been realized. 
 
 2.2 Hypotheses development 
As just explained, finding that value that could clearly show the reaction of groups to the new 
consolidation rules was not that easy, considering the loopholes that they might have been 
looking for. Their size, in fact, had remained unchanged, suggesting for the absence of relevant 
modifications, but other amounts might have been adjusted. 
Our first clue was that of finding the dependent variable among the equity investments held, 
but those might have been recorded in different possible ways. None of the solutions at our 
disposal have been a priori excluded, and this because of the awareness of how clever groups 
might have been and of the different information that each of these amounts provides. Naturally 
sometimes the facts collected my overlap, but in other cases what is told by one of the values 
cannot be understood looking at one of the others. Thus, in order to not leave any possible doubt 
unsolved, it has been decided to run six different analyses, each with its dependent variable and 
its relative hypothesis. 
 
 2.2.1 First hypothesis: analysis of the relative equity investments 
The first hypothesis analyzes the eventual reaction of parents to the introduction of the IFRS 
10, focusing on the relative equity investments. 
What we know about clever parents that prepare the annual reports is that there are cases in 
which they want to hide some of the subsidiaries controlled. Those, in fact, may be used for the 
realization of bad purposes, such as the hiding of undesired liabilities. But, this missed 
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consolidation, is something that only affects the consolidated financial statement, since that it 
will include less companies. If, instead, we look at the equity investments purchased by the 
parent, we should observe a measure that is not affected by these accounting policies. Here, in 
fact, the company is putting together the amounts owned, no matter whether those are to be 
consolidated or not. 
Now, if the IFRS 10 has really been able to eliminate any possibility of manipulations, and 
considered that the size of groups (measured by Lopes and Lopes looking at the total activities) 
has remained unchanged, parents willing to continue to not include these companies in their 
perimeter of consolidation should have dismissed them. As a consequence, the portion of 
activities used to purchase the equity investments should have decreased. 
Starting from this reasoning, it is possible to test the following hypothesis:  
H1: the weight of the equity investments on the activities is negatively associated with the 
introduction of the IFRS 10 
 
2.2.2 Second hypothesis: analysis of the total control 
After having verified whether parents have reacted to the issuance of the IFRS 10 through a 
reduction of the equity investments owned, we have looked at the total linkages connecting the 
companies of the group. 
As we know, looking at the accounting size of groups, it is possible to conclude that the 
introduction of the new consolidation principle has not affected in any way the investment 
decisions of parent companies (Lopes, Lopes 2019). But, if we go deeper, there is another 
information that we can analyze in order to understand if any modification has occurred. In 
their consolidated annual reports, in fact, companies report the structure of the group or they 
list the companies that compose it and the relative percentage of shares owned. These amounts 
do not necessarily fit with the consolidation area since that, because of the low percentage 
owned, the parent may be able to exercise a mere significative influence on it. But, as we know, 
the amount of shares owned is not an objective indicator of the power exercised. 
On the other hand, the IAS 27 left the consolidation of these entities controlled through a little 
portion of shares to the honesty of investors. And we also know that if they want, and if they 
can, they lie (Maroun, van Zijl 2016). 
This implies that, if companies wanted to represent these companies, that were actually 
controlled, as entities on which they were only exercising their influence, they could. 
 Chapter Two 
 
~ 50 ~ 
 
At this point, if the IFRS 10 had been really able to uncover hidden subsidiaries, parents would 
have had to consolidate all the subsidiaries that they were controlling, even through little 
amounts of shares. Consequently, if they wanted to continue to not introduce these companies 
in their consolidation perimeter, they should have dismissed them, and we would have observed 
a reduction of the linkages connecting the companies of the group. 
Starting from this reasoning, it is possible to test the following hypothesis:  
H2: the total linkages connecting the companies composing the group are negatively associated 
with the introduction of the IFRS 10  
 
2.2.3 Third and fourth hypothesis: analysis of direct and indirect control 
The previous hypotheses are mainly focused on the way in which the overall equity investments 
have eventually changed after the introduction of the new consolidation rules, but they do not 
focus on the dichotomy between direct and indirect investments. As we know, in fact, parents 
can expand their power directly, thus personally purchasing the shares of companies, or 
indirectly, letting their subsidiaries buying other entities’ shares. We may think that direct 
investments are made for “industrial” reasons, such as the ability of reaching new markets or to 
start the activity in a new industry. Differently, indirect investments may be more focused on 
riskier activities (the parent has to consolidate just the percentage owned, which is eventually 
little), may be the ones used to hide undesired liabilities and may be the ones easier to be not 
consolidated. If so it is, it may be that the introduction of the IFRS 10 has somehow influenced 
the way in which those investments are made. It may be, in fact, that, being the parent unable 
to continue to hide these subsidiaries, it has decided to divest the indirect investments. On the 
other hand, it might have preferred to acquire them directly, in order to personally control those 
risky activities. 
Starting from this reasoning, it is possible to test the following hypothesis referred to direct 
investments:  
H3: the total linkages connecting directly the companies of the group is positively associated 
with the introduction of the IFRS 10 
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It may seem that this last hypothesis is contradictory in comparison to what is stated in the first 
one. We may wonder, in fact, how we could expect an increase of the direct linkages when, 
instead, the relative equity investments are expected to decrease. Well, this would be possible 
because parents would reduce the indirect investments, completely dismissing them (which is 
the reason why we can expect a reduction of the overall investments) or transforming these 
participations in direct ones (which is why we expect an increase of the direct holdings). 
Then, the reasoning has been furtherly tested through this additional hypothesis: 
H4: the total linkages connecting indirectly the companies of the group is negatively associated 
with the introduction of the IFRS 10 
 
2.2.4 Fifth and sixth hypothesis: analysis of relative direct and indirect control 
The reasoning that has been explained in the previous paragraph may be tested in another way. 
In particular, we may think that the choice between direct and indirect investments can be 
analyzed more adequately looking at the way in which their proportion has eventually changed 
considering the whole linkages connecting the companies of the group. In this way, in fact, we 
would eventually appreciate the way in which companies have preferred the direct 
participations to the indirect ones. In particular, also if the overall linkages had not changed, if 
the relative direct investments had increased, we might have thought that there had been a 
dismissal of the indirect ones, such that the direct had assumed a higher weight. 
The analysis of these amounts in relative terms better highlights the way in which the company 
has eventually decided to shift toward the direct investments because it does not suffer of the 
dimensionality of the specific company considered. 
 Starting from this reasoning, it is possible to test the following hypothesis referred to the direct 
investments:  
H5: the weight of the direct linkages on the total ones connecting the companies of the group is 
positively associated with the introduction of the IFRS 10 
 
Then, the reasoning has been furtherly proven through the following hypothesis: 
H6: the weight of the indirect linkages on the total ones connecting the companies of the group 
is negatively associated with the introduction of the IFRS 10 
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 2.3 Definition of the sample 
Building an analysis, no matter the kind of question it should answer to, needs, first of all, the 
identification of a sample that can represent the behavior of the entire population in the best 
possible way. Word of the inferential statistic. 
In the case of this analysis, the first requisite was that of looking at groups listed in the stock 
markets placed in one of those one hundred and twenty countries adopting the IFRS. 
Differently, in fact, those entities are not obliged to follow the rules provided by this set of 
principles32, and this would have made harder the creation of a proper sample since that it would 
have implied the research for these groups among all the possible entities that would have been 
found. Moreover, whenever a company decides for the listing, the relative market asks it to 
comply with specific requirements that unlisted companies, that voluntarily choose to adopt the 
IFRS, do not necessarily present. This implies that, analyzing a sample not composed of listed 
companies, would not allow the generalization of the results obtained that, instead, is what we 
are looking for. 
Stated this, it has been necessary to choose the specific stock exchange to be considered. The 
choice fell on the domestic Borsa Italiana, one of the biggest in Europe, aimed at “optimizing 
liquidity, transparency, competitivity and efficiency”33 with the idea that it would have allowed 
an easier collection of the data. 
Then, once chosen the stock exchange, it was necessary to choose the specific market and the 
relative segment34 from which picking up the sample. 
 
                                                          
32 For deeper insights about the adoption of these rules look at paragraph 1.3 Ruling the 
preparation of the balance sheet: economic principles. 
33 This is the description that Borsa Italiana it-self provides on its website borsaitaliana.it. 
34 Borsa Italiana manages different types of markets, in particular: stock markets (such as MTA 
and MIV), bond and fixed income markets (such as MOT and SeDex), derivatives markets 
(such as IDEM and IDEX) and the EFTplus, that is a ETP market. Each of these markets 
provides the trading of specific financial instruments and has its own rules. 
Then, those markets can be furtherly divided in segments. 
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The decision to operate in this way, rather than analyzing the whole amount of groups listed, 
was simply carried by the awareness that it would have been impossible to manage 
appropriately a bigger amount of data, and this would have not allowed an acceptable quality 
of the relative results. In the same way, if the groups to be analyzed had been chosen randomly 
taking them from all the markets, with all the relative possible segments, it would have been 
impossible to control for all the elements, specific of each division, affecting their behavior and 
the results of the analysis would have been biased. 
Considered all these elements, it has been decided to make reference to the segment STAR 
(Segmento Titoli con Alti Requisiti). 
It is part of the MTA (Mercato Telematico Azionario), an order-driven market on which, among 
the others, it is possible to trade every type of shares, convertible bonds and warrants. It is 
divided in different segments, on the basis of the capitalization of the instruments to be traded; 
those are the blue chips, the STAR and the ordinary one. 
On the STAR, traders have the possibility to exchange shares whose capitalization is between 
€ 40 million and € 1,000 million, issued by companies committed in complying with specific 
requirements regarding the corporate governance, the public disclosure and the liquidity. More 
specifically, those entities must present independent directors, an internal committee and 
another one for the remuneration; moreover, they have to publish quarterly reports, must be 
ready to provide information to the public and their free float35 must be kept at least at its 20%. 
Having to comply with these requirements, it is immediately clear how those entities can be 
considered of good quality, thus we would expect them to behave properly, without looking for 
loopholes that might be aimed at avoiding a truthful consolidation. 
Moreover, in this way, we are not verifying our hypothesis looking at bad companies, which 
may be more inclined to behave unproperly and which may mistakenly lead us to accept the 
hypothesis. 
                                                          
35 The free float is that portion of shares that can be actually traded on the market, thus is does 
not include the control shares that cannot be traded on the stock market. It is because of this, 
that for companies requiring the entrance in the STAR, it is required a level of free float that is 
higher (35%) than the one to be kept during the permanence in this segment. 
 Chapter Two 
 
~ 54 ~ 
 
The definition of the sample to be analyzed was not as straightforward as it could be imagined. 
In particular, it was necessary to get the catalog of the groups listed in the STAR during the 
period over which the analysis has been carried36, thus from 2010 to 2016. 
The first issue consisted in the precise identification of the list updated at 2016. Being it 
impossible to be found, considered the tools at our disposal, it has been decided to refer to a 
catalog updated at 2017. This one has then been refined, eliminating those entities that had 
listed in the segment of our interest only in 2017. 
After having obtained this raw sample, it started the definition of the final one, through the 
application of different criteria. 
First of all, it was necessary to understand which, of the entities considered, had been listed 
during the whole period. This step has allowed to remove fourteen groups from the initial list, 
since that they had entered STAR during, or even after, 2010. If those observations had not 
been eliminated, the analysis would have not referred to a homogeneous sample. In fact, the 
eventual change of the behavior of the parent might have been affected by the fact that the group 
had accessed the segment, and not by the introduction of the new standard. Moreover, being 
the years of access all different, it would have neither been possible to adopt a variable that 
would have controlled this effect. 
Finally, the elimination of the entities listed in 2010 was considered to be appropriate because 
those had not entered STAR on January, 1st but later in the year, even during December, which 
meant that those would have still not been homogeneous with the others, that had been listed 
during the entire period. 
The subsequent pace consisted of the elimination of those groups operating in the financial 
sector. This decision came from the idea that their investment activity follows a very particular 
path, mainly aimed at gaining money rather than at enlarging the industrial activity, satisfying 
new needs or, as another example, reaching new geographical areas. It is even true that this 
peculiarity of theirs, might have been controlled introducing a dummy in the regression, but it 
was not considered enough. The fear, in fact, was that the final results would still have been 
biased by the data regarding those entities. 
                                                          
36 The definition of the period will be later explained. 
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After the elimination of these other nine elements, the final definition of the sample came 
collecting the data37. In particular, it was not possible to collect all the balance sheets from 
which the data have been collected. There were cases in which it was not possible to find both, 
the consolidated and the separate annual reports, and others in which the separate financial 
statement was the only missing. In some cases, this unavailability was due to the fact that the 
archives did not reach the period of our interest, but stopped before. In other cases, this was due 
to an incorporation of the group in another entity that had not provided to put at the public 
disposal the old documents. 
Considered all these elements, at the end the sample was composed of thirty-six groups, 
observed over seven years, for a total of two hundred and fifty-two observations38. 
 
                                                          
37 The accounting data have been collected from the annual reports published in the relative 
websites, in the investor relations section (specifically listed in a dedicated section of the 
sitography). In some cases it has been necessary to consult specific newspaper articles to 
properly understand which was the year in which the company had entered the STAR segment. 
The data regarding the price of the actions have all been collected from the Investing.com 
website. 
Before than processing the data, those have been standardized through a conversion in Euro 
(the reference exchange rate is the one recorded on December, 31st of the corresponding year, 
available on the cambio-euro.it website). The choice of the final currency simply came from 
the fact that the majority of the records was in the European legal tender, thus there would have 
been few transformations to be made, and this would have reduced eventual errors. 
The further adaptation necessary for the standardization of the values, has consisted in their 
transformation in thousands. The decision to adopt this unit of measure has come from the fact 
that there were cases in which the company presented its records in thousands. As a 
consequence, if rather than considering our data in thousands, we had just multiplied the amount 
relative to these companies for one thousand, the data collected would have not been uniform, 
thus we have preferred to divide for one thousand the other companies’ records. 
Finally, the data have been organized in an Excel file suitable for the software Stata. 
38 In the Appendix, in the Table A.1 Definition of the sample it is possible to find the description, 
in detail, of which were the groups initially composing the sample, which of them were 
excluded, with a specification of the relative reason, and which, instead, have been kept for the 
definition of the final sample. 
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As anticipated, the observations regarding the sample have been collected referring to the period 
2010-2016. 
Identifying the period over which realizing the analysis is of extreme relevance. It may be, in 
fact, that companies had anticipated the effect coming from the introduction of the new 
standard, thus modifying the composition of their investment portfolios. It should also be 
remembered that the standard was introduced with all the other principles being part of the 
consolidation package, and this might have pushed groups to furtherly modify their behavior, 
in response of these new rules. 
Thus, it is important to collect data over a period, earlier to the introduction of the IFRS 10, 
long enough to show and eventually absorb the possible reactions. 
On the other hand, it is necessary as well to look at a consecutive period long enough to show 
all the eventual responses put in place by the groups. In fact, if they had somehow decided to 
dismiss some of their equity investments (or to buy new ones) as a consequence of the new 
provisions, they might have not been able to do that immediately. 
Considered these points, and what generally happens when studying the functioning of an 
economic entity, it has been chosen to conduct the analysis observing the data collected at least 
over three years before, and three years after, the adoption of the consolidation package. 
The final issue that cannot be ignored, regards the year in which the group starts to prepare its 
financial statement applying the new economic principles. 
The IASB, in fact, had required its introduction starting from 2013 but, as already explained, 
the European Union had provided a later application, starting from 2014, even allowing an 
earlier adoption. This implied that there would have been groups introducing the new rules in 
2013, and others in 2014. 
Looking in detail at our sample, the earlier application was very rare, but still occurring. 
Because of that, it has been decided to start the collection of the data since 2010, in order to 
cover at least the three previous years that we were looking for, considering those entities 
deciding for the anticipated adoption. Similarly, the collection of the data stops at 2016 to 
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 2.4 Definition of the models analyzed 
Having clarified the sample adopted for the realization of the analysis, we will now present the 
equations developed in order to test the hypotheses previously illustrated. 
 
The first hypothesis, the one focusing on the relative equity investments, has been tested 
through the following model: 
REL.EQ.INV. = β0 + β1 ∗ IFRS10 + β2 ∗ ROEG + β3 ∗ LNTOTACTG + β4 ∗ DEBRATG + 
+ β5 ∗ ROEP + β6 ∗ LNTOTACTP + β7 ∗ DEBRATP + β8 ∗ MBRP + 
+ β9 ∗ DIMBOD + β10 ∗ CONPAR + ε 
[Equation 2.1] 
 
The second hypothesis, the one referred to the total control, has been tested through the 
following model: 
TOT.CON. = β0 + β1 ∗ IFRS10 + β2 ∗ ROEG + β3 ∗ LNTOTACTG + β4 ∗ DEBRATG + 
+ β5 ∗ ROEP + β6 ∗ LNTOTACTP + β7 ∗ DEBRATP + β8 ∗ MBRP + 
+ β9 ∗ DIMBOD + β10 ∗ CONPAR + ε 
[Equation 2.2] 
 
The third hypothesis, focusing on the absolute direct investments, has been tested through the 
following model: 
DIR.CON. = β0 + β1 ∗ IFRS10 + β2 ∗ ROEG + β3 ∗ LNTOTACTG + β4 ∗ DEBRATG + 
+ β5 ∗ ROEP + β6 ∗ LNTOTACTP + β7 ∗ DEBRATP + β8 ∗ MBRP + 
+ β9 ∗ DIMBOD + β10 ∗ CONPAR + ε 
[Equation 2.3] 
 
The fourth hypothesis, focused on the absolute indirect investments, has been tested through 
the following model: 
IND.CON. = β0 + β1 ∗ IFRS10 + β2 ∗ ROEG + β3 ∗ LNTOTACTG + β4 ∗ DEBRATG + 
+ β5 ∗ ROEP + β6 ∗ LNTOTACTP + β7 ∗ DEBRATP + β8 ∗ MBRP + 
+ β9 ∗ DIMBOD + β10 ∗ CONPAR + ε 
[Equation 2.4] 
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The fifth hypothesis, focused on the relative direct investments has been tested through the 
following model: 
REL.DIR.CON. = β0 + β1 ∗ IFRS10 + β2 ∗ ROEG + β3 ∗ LNTOTACTG + β4 ∗ DEBRATG + 
+ β5 ∗ ROEP + β6 ∗ LNTOTACTP + β7 ∗ DEBRATP + β8 ∗ MBRP + 
+ β9 ∗ DIMBOD + β10 ∗ CONPAR + ε 
[Equation 2.5] 
 
The sixth, and last, hypothesis referred to the relative indirect participations has been tested 
through the following model: 
REL.IND.CON. = β0 + β1 ∗ IFRS10 + β2 ∗ ROEG + β3 ∗ LNTOTACTG + β4 ∗ DEBRATG + 
+ β5 ∗ ROEP + β6 ∗ LNTOTACTP + β7 ∗ DEBRATP + β8 ∗ MBRP + 
+ β9 ∗ DIMBOD + β10 ∗ CONPAR + ε 
[Equation 2.6] 
 
 2.5 Explanation of the variables 
The models introduced in the previous paragraph present a series of variables which will now 
be properly explained. 
 
REL.EQ.INV. stands for relative equity investments. This variable has been computed as: 





The aggregate has been considered in relative terms, with the aim of eliminating any possible 
effect coming from the specific dimensionality of the observation considered. 
Looking at this variable allows to take into account all the shares held by the parent, without 
any exclusion due to the eventual little amount invested or to other eventual reasons. 
But, on the other hand, it is even true that in this way it is not possible to analyze the path 
followed by the investments held directly or indirectly (companies do not specify how much of 
this amount regards the first or the second type of relation). 
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The other pitfall comes from the fact that here we are not properly considering the effect of the 
consolidation principle, since that the company may be holding an equity investment that does 
not require to be consolidated, no matter the rule adopted. 
Despite these problems and their relevance, it would have not been possible to eliminate this 
variable, considered its relevance and reliability. Above all, accepting them allows to analyze 
an amount that, most of all, cannot be affected by hiding strategies of any kind. 
One of the problems regarding the relative equity investments is that it does not perfectly fit 
with the actual expansion of the consolidation area. Considered this, it has been decided to run 
other analyses, verifying other hypotheses, considering other possible dependent variables that 
would have not been biased by this factor. 
 
TOT.CON. stands for total control. It is the amount of linkages that connect the companies 
being part of the group. 
When computing this amount, it was not considered the size of the participation in the relative 
company. Thus, all connections were involved, no matter how small they could be. 
The other point is that if the shares of one of the companies consolidated were held by more 
than one of the other entities included in the consolidation perimeter, than all the relative 
linkages were considered. This means that if, being companies A, B and C part of the group α, 
A’s shares were purchased by B and C, we would have been computing two linkages and not 
just one.  
The reason behind this choice is that the aim of the research is not that of looking at how many 
companies are part of the group, the objective is that of understanding how the relation among 
these connected entities have eventually been changing after the passage to the IFRS 10. 
The only problem connected to this variable (which, from another point of view, may be seen 
as an advantage) is that it may also include entities that are not to be consolidated, such as the 
related enterprises. There are cases, in fact, where the information presented in the annual report 
do not allow to understand whether the relation with the corporation allows to exercise control, 
or whether such power is obstructed by the significant influence of another investor. 
The consequence of this issue is that we might observe fluctuations that would be mistakenly 
attributed to the adoption of the new consolidation principle, when instead it is not related at all 
with these kinds of investments. 
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DIR.CON. stands for direct control. It is the amount of linkages that directly connect the 
companies being part of the group. 
IND.CON. stands for indirect control. It is the amount of linkages that indirectly connect the 
companies being part of the group. 
The distinction between the direct and the indirect control has been considered to be a 
deepening relevant for the improvement of the quality of the research. It may be, in fact, that 
the management of the equity investments held directly differs from that of those owned 
indirectly. In particular, we may observe that the direct participations are the ones held for the 
pure intention of enlarging the industrial activity. Differently, the ones held indirectly, 
especially if referring to long and complex linkages, may be merely aimed at the attempt to 
disperse the liabilities, trying to hide the inconvenient truth. 
Considered this eventual difference, it was not possible to consider just one or the other 
information and, on the other hand, it was not either possible to ignore both of them. 
 
REL.DIR.CON. stands for relative direct control. This variable has been computed as: 
𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑎𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑝. ℎ. 𝑑. =
𝑎𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 ℎ𝑒𝑙𝑑 𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑙𝑦
𝑎𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 ℎ𝑒𝑙𝑑
. 
[Equation 2.8] 
REL.IND.CON. stands for relative indirect control. This variable has been computed as: 
𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑎𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑝. ℎ. 𝑖. =
𝑎𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 ℎ𝑒𝑙𝑑 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑙𝑦
𝑎𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 ℎ𝑒𝑙𝑑
. 
[Equation 2.9] 
The participations held directly and indirectly have also been considered in their relative forms 
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IFRS10 is the research variable. It refers to the introduction of the new consolidation standard. 
Since that the one referred by this variable is a qualitative information, the most immediate way 
to bring it in the model was that of transforming it into a dummy39. This solution was adoptable 
also because the only need was that of specifying whether the IFRS 10 was adopted or not. 
The variable has been built in such a way that it assumes a value equal to one when the IFRS 
10 was adopted, and equal to zero otherwise. 
 
ROEG is the return on equity computed considering the whole group. As known, this variable 






As many other factors included in the model, this one has been computed looking at both, the 
group as a whole and the parent company only. In this, and all the other cases, the choice has 
been made considering that all the decisions regarding the way in which the participations 
composing the group have been purchased or sold may be affected by the specific 
characteristics of the group, and by the specific needs of the parent. In fact, the latter may decide 
to put in place transactions with companies being part of the group, and those would be naturally 
affected by the financial results of the parent, being the originator of the deal, and of the group, 
since that it will depend on these values the choice of the parent on how to specifically shape 
the business. 
The return on equity has been included in the analysis because it is one of the main indicators 
of the financial profitability of the activity of the company. This index, in fact, synthetically 
shows the impact of the company management on the returns of the investors40. It is, for sure, 
one of the elements that affects the actions undertaken by an entity. 
                                                          
39 A dummy is a variable that can only assume two values, zero and one. It is generally used 
when there is the necessity to introduce a qualitative variable in the model whose information 
conveyed can be reduced to a dichotomous language. For example, we can use it to say whether 
the observations being part of the sample are male or female (Stock, Watson 2008). 
40 The value obtained allows to deepen the knowledge of the return of the capital provided by 
the investors. More precisely, an investor willing to buy new shares in a company, will compare 
the amount here obtained with the cost of equity of that entity. 
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LNTOTACTG is the natural logarithm of the total activities. This variable is obtained 
considering the whole group. 
This amount has been introduced in the model as an indicator of the size of the group, since 
that this is an element that may influence the way in which decisions are taken. 
As an example, we may expect a small company to be willing to expand its dimension, which 
would imply relevant and continuous investments; on the contrary, following the same 
reasoning, we would expect a bigger company to be slow in its trading activity. 
Once collected the data regarding the total of the activities, and after having converted them 
were necessary, the amounts have been linearized, computing their natural logarithm. This was 
a solution necessary to reduce eventual distortions that might have affected negatively the 
quality of the analysis41.  
                                                          
Any business man, in fact, when deciding where to place his money, will first decide whether 
he wants the activity to be risky or not. In both cases, the relative level of remuneration will be 
measured through the interest rate: to the zero-risk operation, it will be associated the risk-free 
rate (𝑟𝑓) that only reflects the systematic risk, the one strictly inherent to the economy, which is 
impossible to be avoided. 
The remuneration of the other activity, instead, will be measured through the cost of equity. 
Such interest rate, given by the equation 𝑘𝑒 = 𝑟𝑓 + 𝛽(𝑟𝑝 − 𝑟𝑓), displays, in addition to the 
systematic risk, the risk premium (𝑟𝑝) connected to the return of the entity, to the disinvestments 
and to the reimbursement of the equity; then, trough the 𝛽 coefficient, it also considers which 
may be the reaction of the enterprise to the shocks of the industry in which it operates (Berk, 
De Marzo 2013). 
At this point, a risk-neutral investor, will choose to invest in a company only when its ROE will 
be above the cost of equity, since that in this case the possibility to obtain positive returns will 
be higher (Sostero, et al., 2018).  
41 These adaptations are made when the independent variable is correlated with the dependent 
one through a non-linear relation. Because of that, it is necessary to linearize its data in order 
to reduce the distortions that may influence negatively the results. The transformation of this 
reasoning in mathematical terms requires to compute the natural logarithm of the value, being 
this the function that allows the transformation of a curve into a line (De Giorgi, 2018). The 
result is a linear-log relation, which states that to each marginal variation of the dependent 
variable, corresponds a one-hundred percent variation of the independent amount. Without this 
adjustment, the construction of the variable would have said that to each marginal variation of 
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DEBRATG is the debt ratio of the group. This variable could be computed in two possible ways: 
𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 =




This formulation allows to collect information about the level of capitalization and indebtedness 
of the company. 
Specifically, in this way, it is possible to better understand in which measure the entity uses its 
own financial sources to finance its activities. Because of that, it is a measure of the financial 
soundness. 






It is quite evident how this second version of the ratio, even if apparently providing the same 
information, is now telling us something different. Through this solution, in fact, it is possible 
to focus on the measure in which the entity relies on third parties’ sources to finance its activity. 
In particular, in our analysis, the amount of third parties’ equity has been obtained as the 
summation of all the financial sources provided from operators external to the company, 
without including any kind of commercial, legal or fiscal debt. Moreover, all the amounts 
coming from relations with related parties were excluded. 
The idea was that of obtaining a measure as pure as possible of how much the group and the 
parent were relying on external financings. 
No matter the way in which the ratio is computed, it allows to get information about the 
financial sustainability of a company42 and, because of that, it may be the driver of the decisions 
                                                          
the dependent variable it corresponded a marginal variation of the independent one, which 
would have not been possible considering the dimension of the total activities (Stock, Watson 
2008). 
42 Even if this ratio allows to know more about the financial condition of the company, it is not 
possible to make general considerations of the results obtained. Whenever trying to evaluate 
the financial soundness of a company looking at this ratio, it will only be possible to make 
comparisons with the results obtained over the years by the specific company and to ask it to 
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that it takes. Among the others, it may have a strict connection with the eventual attempts of 
adopting loopholes realized by the economic entity. What we may expect, in fact, is that a 
company being in a sustainable economic condition, is more prone to be honest in the 
preparation of its documents, without particular attempts of finding ways to hide the truth. On 
the other hand, a company being in an unfavorable financial condition, may be more likely to 
adopt loopholes to not show its real condition. In order to better understand this point, we may 
think of an entity, trying to obtain financings from third parties, while being in a bad economic 
situation. This entity will be incentivized to hide its real condition, in order to obtain that money. 
These alternatives at our disposal are not providing the same pieces of information, and this is 
the reason why it was very hard to choose between one or the other version. 
It is even true that it might have also been possible to include both the computations, the one 
highlighting the financial independence and that focusing on the dependency. But, despite the 
difference, the model might have still been affected by the redundancy of what the variables 
were saying, after all we were always talking about the debt ratio. 
Because of that, it has been decided to test the model running it in the two different ways, each 
of them considering only one of the two variations. But, after the first analyses, it was possible 
to observe how the results obtained through the adoption of the version of the debt ratio more 
focused on the financial dependence were not as good as the ones obtained in the other case. 
Even when both regressions were providing acceptable results, in fact, the ones connected to 
this formulation were weaker. 
Above this, there was the issue regarding the way in which the data relative to this computation 
had been collected. In fact, even if those had been taken by the official documents published by 
our sample, could not be considered totally reliable. 
                                                          
keep the debt at a sustainable level (Sostero et al., 2018). This issue is due to the fact that the 
level of debt depends on the economic activity carried on. It may be possible to solve this issue 
by making comparisons with other companies operating in the same industry. But, even in this 
case, there might be differences that might interfere with the judgments. Those problems may 
come from the different financing choices of the specific companies, since that one may decide 
to raise funds through the listing, while others may opt for the bank lending. Because of this 
last point, it would not be impossible to have a level of debt that exceeds of even four or five 
times the equity. 
Despite this, it will be important for companies to control their level of debt, making sure that 
it will always be sustainable, considered their capitalization. 
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That was because of the way in which the information had been presented in the annual reports 
and what was necessary for our interests. In particular, the idea was that of adding only those 
financings coming from third, unrelated, parties. Because of that, in most of the cases, it has 
been possible to pick only those debts, listed among the financial liabilities, excluding those 
provided by related parties. But, in many other cases, these specifications were not provided, 
neither in the notes, and it was necessary to come out with an interpretation of what was missing. 
This obstacle is something that cannot be left apart, especially when the objective is that of 
obtaining as reliable as possible results. 
Keeping in mind these considerations, it has been considered better to introduce in the final 
model the first computation of the ratio, illustrated in the Equation 2.11. 
 
ROEP, LNTOTACTP and DEBRATP are, respectively, the return on equity, the natural 
logarithm of the total activities and the debt ratio, all computed looking at the parent company 
only. 
 
MBRP is the market to book ratio. This amount has been computed as follows, looking at the 
parent company only: 
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑡𝑜 𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 =




After having considered the variables that might affect the attitude of the company from the 
inside, we have shifted our considerations toward the external environment. 
One of the ratios that allows to have a clue about the idea that the market has about the company 
is the market to book ratio43. It may be, in fact, that the incentive to make one or another choice 
comes from this outer judgment, thus it cannot be omitted from our research. 
                                                          
43 Considered the way in which it is structured, the ratio allows to compare the accounting 
evaluation of the company, with the one provided by the market. 
If the ratio is above (below) one, it means that the market value is higher (lower) than the 
accounting one, implying that the valuation provided by the market is better (worse) than the 
one directly given from the company. This may be the result of an under-estimation (over-
estimation) of the entity, eventually due to specific information that it has and that may justify 
the amount. On the other hand, it may also come from an over-estimation (under-estimation) of 
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As the Equation 2.13 explains, the computation of this variable requires the collection of three 
data. Two of these, the equity and the outstanding shares, have been recorded considering the 
amount registered at the end of the year. 
Differently, the information about the price of the action has been recorded looking at the last 
amount available for that year. The eventual mismatch could not be avoided, since that the stock 
markets are not open during holidays. 
 
DIMBOD stands for dimension of the board of directors.  
The decision to include this amount comes from the awareness of the huge impact that the board 
of directors has on the activities carried by the entity. 
Actually, the information provided by this variable might have been deepened, considering that 
the quality of the activity that this body exercises improves whenever the heterogeneity of its 
composition increases. In this case, in fact, it would be possible to enjoy the contribution of 
people with ideas that differ one from the other, because of different ages, genders, social or 
educational backgrounds (Erhardt, Werbel and Shrader, 2003). 
Moreover, when thinking about the impact that the board of directors might have had on the 
decision about how to shape the consolidation area, it has been initially thought that there was 
a specification that should have not been omitted. This specification regarded the independence 
of the people composing it. 
Many researches, in fact, have proven how strong the positive impact of independent directors 
can be on the performance of the entity (Duppati, Scrimgeour and Sune 2019). Observing this 
positive influence mainly in those cases in which it was necessary to control the possible abuses 
that might have been put in place by related parties (Khosa 2016). 
Considered this, it might have been possible that the behavior of the groups here analyzed would 
have been strongly impacted by the presence of this type of directors. We might have expected, 
in fact, that those had been able to control the attempts of adopting tricks for a favorable 
interpretation of the economic principles. 
                                                          
the market, which has a preferential view, being able to look at all the enterprises operating in 
a specific industry and to identify opportunities that may be hidden to the short-sighted 
perspective of the company. 
Finally, the value computed may also be equal to one, meaning that there is a coincidence 
between the two evaluations at our disposal. 
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As a consequence, not including this information in the regression might have biased the results. 
In fact, we would have been evaluating in the same way the path followed by the equity 
investments held by a company with no independent directors, and that realized by another 
entity with independent components of the board. This might have led us to think that (in case 
of refusal of the null hypothesis) groups had honestly followed the provisions of the 
consolidation principles when, instead, any eventual bad intention was stopped by their 
directors. 
At that point, we had to consider the sample that was being used for this specific analysis. As 
already highlighted in paragraph 2.3 Definition of the sample, the observations are collected 
considering the groups listed in the STAR segment of the Italian stock exchanges. Among the 
other requisites that those entities have to comply with for their permanence in the segment, 
there is the one regarding the composition of the board of directors. In particular, they are 
required to have a minimum amount of independent members in this body. 
This specific condition might have made useless the introduction of the relative variable in our 
model. No matter the percentage of independent directors, in fact, all groups would have had 
those members, meaning that each of them might have been stopped from the endeavor to 
manipulate the rules. The only additional information would have regarded the specific weight 
that these people had in the body, but this addition might have been useless, especially 
considering the final aim of this research. 
Another condition that prevented us from the inclusion of this variable was the unavailability 
of the relative data. Reading the annual reports of our observations, in fact, sometimes it was 
not possible to understand how many independent components they had in their board. Because 
of this, taking this amount in our regression, would have required a further reduction of the size 
of the sample and this might have not allowed to obtain acceptable results. 
Despite this, we still have verified which would have been its impact on our results, but we 
concluded for any improvement of them. 
As a result, also considering that the final objective of this research is not strictly connected to 
the effects of the composition of the board of directors on the corporate performance, it has 
been decided to not introduce these further specifications in our final models and it has been 
evaluated as enough the introduction of these factors through a more generic amount, that is the 
size of the body. This one, in fact, may be a good approximation of its diversity, since that we 
may think that the more the people composing it, the higher its heterogeneity. 
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CONPAR stands for control of the parent. This variable is a dummy which states whether the 
parent company is it-self controlled by another holding or not. 
The decision to include this information has come from the awareness that if the company is 
controlled, then the decisions about the investments to be acquired or dismissed are not 
necessarily taken on the basis of its interests. It may be, in fact, that it is being used by its 
investor as a puppet to realize specific transactions. In that case, those trades could not be judged 
in the same way in which those realized by “independent” parents are. The entity that we are 
analyzing, in fact, would be subject to a bigger design that we are missing, not being aware of 
the superior management that shapes its behavior. 
The construction of the variable is such that it is equal to zero if the parent is controlled by 
another entity, to one otherwise. 
Before moving on, it is important to understand how this information has been defined. The 
first intention was that of considering as controlled all those parents for which the majority of 
the shares was owned by one investor only. Applying this reasoning, all the cases in which this 
majority investor had been a member of the founder family, the parent would have not been 
considered as controlled, since that it would not have been subject to the direction of another 
holding. 
But, when putting in practice this general idea, it has been possible to observe that this kind of 
deduction was not always correct. There were cases, in fact, were the parent declared to be 
controlled also if the holding held less than the 51% percent of shares which we would have 
referred to; then, there were other situations in which, even holding the majority of the shares, 
the entity was not controlling our parent. 
Taking these observations into account, it has been decided to report the punctual information 
whenever it was provided, and to opt for the deduction in those few cases in which this eventual 
submission to a third party’s control was not explicitly stated. 
 
2.6 Deepening of the model 
In the first chapter, while going through the theoretical basis for the assessment of our research, 
it has been possible to observe how the behavior of big groups could differ from that of smaller 
ones (see paragraph 1.2.1 Defining the consolidation area: difficulties and attempts). In 
particular, it may be that bigger groups are able to hide more subsidiaries (Hsu, Pourjalali, 
2015). 
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Considering our analysis, we may think that, by only focusing on bigger groups we would have 
more chances to observe a strict correlation between the path followed by the equity 
investments and the introduction of the IFRS 10. 
Because of these points, it has been considered better to not neglect this distinction and its 
eventual consequences. Thus, all the models introduced until this moment, have been tested by 
considering the whole sample first, and then separately, the big and the small groups only. This 
has allowed us to obtain three different versions of each of the equations run. 
The practical application of this reasoning has started by the computation of the median of the 
logarithm of the total activities. It has not been considered appropriate to opt for the average 
since that it may be affected by the extreme values, leading to an uninformative result (Borra, 
Di Ciaccio 2014). 
The decision to look at this amount to classify the observations simply came from the awareness 
that this is the only accounting value that allows to describe the size of a firm. 
After this, all the groups that, for all the years considered, presented a dimensional value that 
was above the median, were considered to be big. All the others were considered as small. 
In some cases, the value assumed did not allow an immediate classification of the observation. 
In order to solve these issues, it has been chosen to consider as big those groups that, for the 
majority of the years, accounted a value above the median. When neither this consideration was 
enough for the categorization, the focus was on the 2013-2014 period, since that it should have 
been the most important point in time for our analysis. 
 
 2.7 Additional tests to prove the robustness of the model 
Before than evaluating the results of the analyses, we have run tests specifically aimed at 
understanding whether it was possible to improve our research. 
 
 2.7.1 Relevance of group and parent-related variables  
The first test has regarded the need of controlling for both, the parent and the group. 
When defining the variables to be collected and the entity (the group or the parent) to which to 
look at, it was wondered whether it was necessary to look at both, the group in its entirety and 
the parent company only. 
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Since the first moment, it appeared to be an unfounded doubt, since that it seemed obvious that 
the answer that we were looking for could only be obtained by looking at both, the “player” and 
the “toy”, to properly understand what was happening. 
We have to think, in fact, that the parent is the one that, from the top, decides how to shape the 
group. It has an overview on all its controlled entities, and this eventually allows a malicious 
parent to understand how to properly place the earnings or how it is better to operate to hide 
undesired liabilities. 
On the other hand, it is not possible to leave apart the group, since that it is just its performance 
the factor that mainly impacts the guide lines decided by the parent. 
Despite this awareness, it has been considered better to verify this suspicion but, as expected, 
we have noticed how the results of the relative analyses were only worsening. This suggested 
that, when excluding the parent or the group from the analysis, we were missing relevant 
information. 
Considered these facts, it has been decided that, in the final versions of our models, we would 
have included the observations regarding both realities. 
 
 2.7.2 Robust standard errors 
The other test has regarded the possibility of adopting robust standard errors. 
When running the linear regression, it is of absolute importance to look at what happens to the 
errors. In particular, it is necessary to look at the dispersion of their distribution44, described by 
the standard errors (Stock, Watson 2005). 
When realizing an analysis, it is not possible to know which is the distribution presented by the 
errors. And, on the other hand, the standard errors generally computed, consider a 
homoscedastic distribution of the errors. 
These two factors together may take to harbinger results. 
                                                          
44 The distribution of the errors can be of two types: 
1. Homoscedastic: in this case, errors do not follow any particular distribution, they are 
dispersed uniformly in the whole quadrant; 
2. Heteroscedastic: in this case, errors follow a particular distribution. 
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In order to solve this eventual problem, and to improve the quality of the research run, we have 
tested the robustness of our models adopting robust standard errors. Those ones, in fact, take 
into account the specific distribution of the errors, avoiding possible misunderstandings. 
The results of the two versions of the models (with and without standard errors) did not differ 
that much but, in the final version of the research., we have still decided to apply the robust 









THE RESULTS OF THE ANALYSIS 
  
 3.1 Statistical description of the variables 
The realization of the analysis has been possible thanks to the different variables that we have 
selected for our equations. Before than presenting the results of the research, we now introduce 
a quantitative description of those amounts. 
The following table shows the statistical measures45 to consider for the description of the 
quantitative variables adopted in our research. 
 
 
                                                          
45 We will first look at the minimum and the maximum values to understand the amplitude of 
the amounts collected, and to have a better knowledge of our sample. 
Other tools are represented by the arithmetic mean, which describes the distribution of the 
variable through one synthetic value, and the median, a specific version of the mean, the one 
that is the least sensitive to the extreme amounts, which can also be adopted when the variable 
is a qualitative one. Given a list of values ordered following a specific criterion, in fact, it 
provides its central unit. 
Finally, we can refer to the standard deviation. This is a measure that allows to know the 
measure in which the variable disentangles from the mean value. Through this amount, we can 
furtherly get the level of dispersion of the data collected (Stock, Watson 2008). 
When dealing with the qualitative amounts we will look at the different shapes that the 
frequency can assume. First of all, we will analyze the absolute frequency that allows to know 
how many times it is possible to count a characteristic in the sample. Then we can rationalize 
the amount, obtaining the relative frequency. This version enables to know how many times 
that character is observed, considering the size of the whole sample. It is computed, in fact, as 
the ratio between the absolute frequency and the total of the observations collected. Finally, we 
will consider the relative percentage frequency which reports the same information of the 
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Table 3.1 Description of the quantitative variables  
 
 





1,21% 95,29% 32,52% 29,09% 0,215 
Total control 2 117 21,49 16 17,849 
Direct control 2 117 11,92 9 13,616 
Relative direct control 6,35% 100% 64,36% 64% 0,271 
Indirect control 0 61 9,826 4 12,972 
Relative indirect control 0,00% 93,65% 35,45% 36% 0,271 
ROE (groups) -73,88% 59,52% 6,01% 6% 0,144 
LN of total activities 
(groups) 
10,261 14,705 12,791 12,77 0,905 
Debt ratio (groups) 18,74% 620,89% 164,99% 149% 1,006 
ROE (parent) -76,80% 66,62% 5,00% 4,00% 0,144 
LN of total activities 
(parent) 
10,363 14,529 12,497 12,56 0,843 
Debt ratio (parent) 0,68% 545,76% 130% 121% 0,882 
Market to book ratio 
(parent) 
0,118 14,044 1,699 1,08 1,901 
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The first variable is the one referring to the relative equity investments. Its smallest value is 
1,21%, while the highest is 95,29%. 
The first amount refers to the equity investments held by La Doria in 2013, a medium sized 
company, with a discrete ROE, that over the years until 2013 had been constantly decreasing 
the participations held, for then starting, in 2014, to invest higher amounts. 
The other value instead, the maximum one, is recorded looking at D’Amico in 2010, still a 
medium sized entity, with a ROE surely not worthy of note. It is not possible to precisely define 
the path followed by these investments, they have always been very high over the period, never 
going below the 77%, but without following a particular decreasing trend. 
Continuing the description, we can focus on the mean, which equals 32,52%, on the median 
which records a value of 29,09% and on the standard deviation, equal to 0,215. 
These data suggest how variable the choices made by the parents of our sample can be. It is not 
possible to say that they have always been strict, or large on the contrary, in their investments, 
that is what the minimum and maximum value may suggest. On the other hand, if we stop for 
a while on the average values, we can say that they have tried to be prudent in these purchases, 
generally investing a relatively small portion of their activities in the acquisition of other 
entities’ shares. This is not a behavior that can be, somehow, judged. We know, in fact, that 
these decisions can be influenced by various factors, such as the future plans or the desired size 
of the group, and it is not possible to understand what has been going on without specifically 
analyzing the managerial choices made over the years. 
The other dependent variable that we have analyzed is represented by the total linkages 
connecting the companies within the group. In this case the range of values covered is even 
bigger, in fact it goes from a minimum of two, to a maximum of 117. 
The smallest value is recorded by Centrale del Latte d’Italia in 2013, a small group that has 
never had delusions of grandeur. Its size, in fact, has always been between four and two 
companies. This may be the attitude of a group not willing to conquer huge markets, but trying 
to improve as much as possible its industrial activity. 
The highest value, instead, is accounted by Reply in 2016, a big group that has been 
continuously growing over the years, going from 43 to 117 companies. Being in the IT industry, 
maybe it has been trying to acquire as many companies as possible to not lose any innovative 
idea, or maybe it just wanted to increase its size and its power. Again, not knowing the specific 
managerial plan, we cannot say that much. 
Concluding this description, we can observe the mean value, equal to 21,49, the median equal 
to 16, and the standard deviation being 17,849. 
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Then we shift to the amount of participations directly held. In this case the minimum and the 
maximum value equal the ones that we have observed looking at the total of the participations 
held. This is simply due to the fact that both companies have decide to only invest directly in 
their subsidiaries. 
Differently, the mean equals 11,92, the median 9, and the standard deviation 13,616. 
These last amounts suggest that generally companies choose to directly invest in a relatively 
small number of companies. This choice may come from an eventual better ability of managing 
them appropriately. 
Still remaining on the direct control, we can now look at its relative version. Its minimum value 
equals 6,35% while its maximum, unsurprisingly, 100%. 
The extreme upper value is reported by fifty of our observations, about one fifth of the whole 
amount. Even if for not the whole period, the following companies have only held direct 
participations: Ascopiave, Centrale del Latte d’Italia, Esprinet, Irce, La Doria, Mondo Tv, 
Reply, Sabaf and Servizi Italia. Considering their diversities, it is not possible to say why they 
have made such choice, it may only be possible to hypothesize that those parents have tried to 
control their subsidiaries as much as they could. 
The smallest amount, instead, refers to Cementir in 2012, a big group with a non-relevant 
performance, that has always preferred to spread its activity through indirect participations. 
Its mean equals, instead, 64,36%, its median 64%, and its standard deviation 0,271. 
Despite the extreme values that we have just recorded, the average ones suggest that generally 
our groups are not that extreme in the direct investments, in favor of the indirect ones. They try, 
in fact, to control directly a bit more than the half of their participations, but nothing more. Even 
without knowing the specific intentions, we may think that this is the consequence of the 
attempt to spread the activity without undertaking an unmanageable ton of work. 
At this point, we can shift to the opposite variable, that is the amount of participations held 
indirectly. We cannot be surprised by its minimum value, being it zero, differently from what 
happens with its maximum, which equals 61. 
Continuing the description, we can record the average equal to 9,826, the mean equal to 4, and 
the standard deviation equal to 12,972. 
Neglecting the extreme values, that have already been discussed in the previous paragraph, we 
can notice how various this variable can be. Anyway, generally groups try not to indirectly 
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Finally, we can conclude by looking at the relative version of the latter variable: the relative 
indirect control. In this case the smallest amount is, naturally, 0,00% and its maximum 93,65%. 
Then we have the mean that records a value of 35,45%, the median with 36%, and the standard 
deviation that equals 0,27146. 
Something that should not surprise us is the missing match between the descriptive values 
referred to the relative equity investments, and the ones regarding the total control. It is not 
strange, in fact, that the companies that record the highest and the lowest amount of relative 
participations are not the same reporting extreme values in terms of linkages unifying the group. 
The width of the group, in fact, is not necessarily linked to the investments made: a company 
may control many small companies, and its group would be big while recording small relative 
equity investments. 
We cannot either forget that the first of the ratios illustrated depends also on the amount of 
activities held by a company, which may be huge and invest a small portion of this value in 
many companies. Anything is relative. 
As known, the good functioning of the linear regression depends on the control variables that 
selected. We will now describe each of them, in order to improve the understanding of the 
sample that has allowed our research. 
Before moving on, we can notice that it misses the description of the research variable, that is 
the dummy describing the introduction of the IFRS 10. This is not an accidental forgetfulness, 
but a precise choice. Being this a qualitative variable, we could have only described it through 
the frequency values, but it is quite obvious that this information would have been totally 
inappropriate. 
The only thing that we can say to describe it is that all groups, with the only exception of Gefran, 
that has opted for an earlier adoption, have decide to apply the standard in 2014. It is quite 
impossible to judge this observation, we can just suppose that groups did not choose to follow 
the rules of the standard earlier because it was quite hard finding the information they would 
have needed, thus they have decided to exploit this additional time at their disposal. 
The first control variable considered is the ROE referred to the groups. This variable assumes, 
as highest value, 59,52% and as minimum -73,88%. 
                                                          
46 Any consideration about this variable would be useless, since that it simply is the opposite of 
the relative direct control, which has just been commented. 
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The low extreme value was reported by Acotel in 2015, a small group that has never been 
accountable for its good performance. Over the years, in fact, this has always been negative, 
with very bad results for the last three years analyzed. Without knowing the specific condition, 
it is impossible to know what has happened to this entity which may have faced a violent crisis 
because of a bad management that has eventually been substituted or because of a bad shot 
relative to its industrial activity. 
The other value, the extremely positive one, is recorded looking at Cairo Communication in 
2013, a big group, mainly expanded through direct participations, that has always reported great 
results. Despite that, it is impossible to not notice the slip made over the last two years observed. 
Even in this case, we cannot know what has taken this company to worsen so much (it has 
reached an ROE of 18%) its performance, after its great results. 
Then, we can report an average value of 6,01%, a median of 6%, and a standard deviation of 
0,144. 
We can now look at the natural logarithm of the total activities of the groups. The smallest 
amount recorded in this case equals 10,261, while the highest 14,705. 
The smallest dimension is the one recorded by Acotel in 2016. We already know this group, 
and it is quite hard to be surprised by the fact that also its activities have been consumed, over 
the years, by its performance. 
The biggest value, instead, is reported by Cementir in 2016, the group that we already know for 
its small amount of participations directly held. Over the period observed, its dimension has 
always been notable (the natural logarithm of the total activities has never gone below 14,4), 
but this cannot surprise us, considering the huge amount of indirect participations that 
characterize its structure. The group, in fact, has never had less than fifty indirect subsidiaries. 
The average value of this variable is 12,791, its median is 12,77, and its standard deviation is 
0,905. 
It now follows the presentation of the debt ratio of groups. The lowest value here is 18,74%, 
while the highest is 620,89%. 
The first of these two amounts is reported by Cembre in 2015, a relatively small group, with a 
moderate performance over the years, that has always managed to contain the level of debt. 
This ratio, in fact, has never gone above 33%. We do not know if this company has decided to 
operate in this way because it has preferred to increase the number of investors rather than that 
of financiers, or because it has simply decided to stay independent. The fact is that, almost 
surely, its problems have never dealt with debts (at least during the period observed). 
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On the totally opposite side we find Ima in 2014, a big group that has always registered a great 
performance and has always heavily relied on debt, being always at least 3,5 times the equity. 
Even in this case we cannot know what has led the company toward this huge dependence from 
the financiers but, anyway, considered its performance and its dimension, we may think that 
they have never had much problems in sustaining their debt. 
Neglecting these extremes, we can also have a look at the mean equal to 164,99%, the median 
equal to 149%, and the standard deviation which equals 1,006. Those last amounts let us 
understand that, despite their huge variety, generally our groups have preferred to rely on debt, 
rather than on equity. 
At this point, we can shift toward the control variables relative to the parent companies. The 
first amount to be described is their ROE. In this case, the lowest value is -76,80%, while the 
highest 66,62%. 
The upper extreme is reported by our Acotel in 2016. Apparently nor the group or the parent 
have ever been able to perform positively. 
The inferior extreme, instead, is observed looking at Ima in 2014. Again, we are not surprised, 
we have already known and appreciated the group, and it seems that we can say the same about 
its parent. 
Above these amounts, it is also possible to consider the mean equal to 5%, the median equal to 
4%, and the standard deviation equal to 0,144. It seems that, on average, the groups have been 
performing better than their parents, but it is even true that they were advantaged because of 
their size and of the higher possibilities at their disposal. 
The size of the parents, instead, still described by the natural logarithm of the activities, goes 
from a minimum of 10,363 to a maximum of 14,529. 
The smallest parent is, unsurprisingly, Acotel in 2016. Even in the case of the parent, in fact, 
the bad performance, maybe among the other factors, has been consuming the activities which 
have continuously decreased over the years. 
The biggest company, instead, is Igd Siiq in 2016, a parent that has always maintained its size 
at a high level. Despite this, it has always reported a barely positive performance, both as a 
standing alone entity and as a group. Maybe it is the case of a company that has a high, but 
unexpressed, potential or that of an entity that has been making many investments and is now 
waiting for their returns to arrive. 
We can furtherly know the size of our parents looking at the mean, equal to 12,497, the median 
equal to 12,56, and the standard deviation equal to 0,843. 
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The other control variable which we have referred to is the debt ratio, whose lowest value is 
0,68%, and its highest 545,76%. 
Here the smallest amount is reported by D’Amico in 2013, the company that we already know 
for its great investments in its subsidiaries. Here we have quite a big group, that has never been 
noticeable for its great performance, nor in terms of group or parent, but that is surely 
accountable for its level of debt, always kept quite low. Maybe, considering the way in which 
the ratio is computed47, this is just the consequence of the huge amount of its activities, maybe 
there is something else. 
The other value, instead, refers to Ima in 2013. Also in this case, there is a similarity between 
the group and the parent and it does not surprise us, in fact we may expect that the parent 
suggests the same behavior that it adopts to its subsidiaries. 
Finally, we can see that the mean of this variable is 130%, the median is 121%, and the standard 
deviation is 0,882. Also the parents have chosen to quite heavily rely on debt. 
We now go to the way in which the market looks at our parents. The minimum value reported 
by the market to book ratio is 0,118, while the maximum is 14,044. 
The parent which the market has the worst consideration of is Mondo Tv in 2011, a tiny group 
with almost always positive performances. We cannot know why the market has rated it so 
badly (the price of its shares at the end of 2011 was less than seventy cents of euro), maybe it 
was weak in its industry and its managers could not see it. 
On the contrary, the best rated parent is Ima in 2014. We already know this company, but now 
we can also notice how, over the years, the market has been increasingly appreciating it, pricing 
its actions until almost fifty-eight euros (2016). 
Despite these extremes, we can also see that the mean value of this variable is 1,699, its median 
is 1,08, and its standard deviation is 1,901. We can just observe how, despite the great variety, 
the parents of our sample have always been generally overrated (in comparison to their own 
accounting estimation) by the market. 
At this point, we can consider the dimension of the board of directors managing the parent. In 
this case, the smallest value is 5, while the highest 15. 
The parents with the lowest amount of directors are Irce and Reno De Medici. It is quite 
impossible to say why these companies have decided to keep their boards so small, maybe they 
were already well-assorted, despite the tiny dimensions, or maybe they did not want their 
                                                          
47 Look at Equation 2.12. 
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decision-making process to be too slow. An appropriate consideration could only be obtained 
looking at their specific conditions. 
A totally opposite decision was the one taken by Igd Siiq from 2010 to 2014, a company whose 
board has never been particularly small (in the following years, in fact, it is composed of thirteen 
directors) and that, maybe because of its dimensions, maybe because of the advantages coming 
from these numbers, has always tried to maintain this size. 
We cannot either forget the others, thus we can notice the mean being equal to 9,186, the median 
to 9, and the standard deviation to 2,372. Despite the variety, companies have always tried to 
have quite big groups of directors managing them. 
 
Having completed the description of the quantitative variables, the following table allows the 
description of the last, qualitative, amount adopted. 
 
Table 3.2 Description of the qualitative variable 
 
This is the dummy referred to the eventual control exercised on the parent.  
The absolute frequency that recorded is 84, meaning that twelve parents were subsidiaries 
themselves. The relative frequency is 
1
3
, and the relative percentage one equals 33,33%. 
Actually it is not possible to say anything about these amounts, if not that not including this 
control variable, we would have missed quite a huge part of information since that one third of 
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3.2 Correlation among the variables 
Another statistical tool that is very useful for the understanding of the variables and for an 
appropriate evaluation of the model applied is the correlation matrix48.  
Before than analyzing the specific level of correlation among the variables considered in the 
different models, it is possible to see how, of all the six analyses run, we can just analyze two 
correlation matrixes. 
As the following tables49 highlight, in fact, the level of correlation was the same if we 
considered, as dependent variables, the relative equity investments and the total control. 
Similarly, we could observe the same values considering the direct control, the relative direct 
control, the indirect control and its relative version too.  
Naturally, in any case, the values connected to the dependent variable considered change. 
The model, despite the version assumed, does not suffer of excessive correlation. In most of the 
cases, in fact, this amount is below ±0,5 meaning that the variables are not extremely correlated. 
Considered the information that this ratio conveys, we may think that our model has been built 
appropriately. 
However, going deeper, it is possible to notice how some variables are quite strongly correlated, 
no matter the model considered. 
 
 
                                                          
48 The correlation explains if, in which measure and in which direction a variable changes in 
response to a variation of another variable. This index can assume values in an interval between 
minus one and one. 
If the amount is close to minus (plus) one, it means that the variables are connected by a strong 
and negative (positive) correlation. As a consequence, it happens that after an alteration of one 
variable, the other changes of the same amount but in the opposite (same) direction. 
If the value is close to zero, it means that it is not possible to observe any correlation between 
the two variables, and any change of one of them does not affect the other (Borra, Di Ciaccio 
2014). 
49 Look at Table 3.3 and Table 3.4. In these charts, the first rows refer to the correlation of the 
dependent variables considered. This representation is aimed at not reporting six tables were 
only the first rows would have been different. 
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First of all, it is possible to have a look at the strong connection between the ROE of the groups 
and that of the parents. In both analyses, in fact, this level of correlation equals 0,845.  
An even stronger dependency is the one that connects the natural logarithm of the activities of 
groups and of their parents. In the first two analyses, in fact, this relation is described by a 
correlation equal to 0,960 while in the others it amounts to 0,948. 
Finally, it is possible to look at the debt ratio of groups and that of parents, that in the first two 
analyses are linked by a correlation of 0,850 and of 0,749 in the others. 
Leaving apart for a moment the implications that these amounts have on the way in which we 
evaluate our models, it is possible to stop thinking about what these interdependencies mean. 
What they say is that the performance, the size and the financial dependency of the group is 
correlated wit that of its parent. But can we really be surprised by that? Maybe not, since that it 
is possible to imagine how the parent somehow influences the choices of the group and vice 
versa.  
Above this natural explanation, it is impossible to forget the implications for the quality of the 
results of the research. These values, in fact, are suggesting that some variables should be 
eliminated from the model, in order to improve the quality of the results. 
Considered this, while running the various regressions, we have tested this deduction, realizing 
analyses that controlled only for the group or only for the parent. The result has been a 
worsening of our p-values, which suggested a further worsening of our regressions. 
Considered this, we will continue to analyze our data controlling for the groups and the parents, 
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 3.3 The results of the analysis 
After having introduced all the models that have been applied, explaining and describing the 








IFRS 10 -0,012 0,019 0,529 -0,050 0,025 
ROEG -0,517 0,138 0,000 -0,790 -0,243 
LN total activitiesG 0,296 0,068 0,000 0,162 0,430 
Debt ratioG 0,097 0,021 0,000 0,056 0,138 
ROEP -0,215 0,131 0,103 -0,474 0,043 
LN total activitiesP -0,284 0,075 0,000 -0,432 -0,136 
Debt ratioP -0,154 0,030 0,000 -0,214 -0,093 
Market to book ratioP 0,025 0,008 0,002 0,009 0,041 
Dimension BoD 0,003 0,004 0,458 -0,005 0,012 
Control of the parent 0,062 0,022 0,007 0,017 0,107 








IFRS 10 0,371 2,134 0,862 -3,833 4,577 
ROEG -4,598 13,396 0,732 -30,987 21,790 
LN total activitiesG 21,143 6,227 0,001 8,875 33,410 
Debt ratioG -5,418 3,292 0,101 -11,904 1,067 
ROEP -11,751 10,978 0,285 -33,376 9,873 
LN total activitiesP -16,638 6,636 0,013 -29,712 -3,565 
Debt ratioP 8,186 4,485 0,069 -0,649 17,021 
Market to book ratioP 1,784 0,935 0,058 -0,058 3,626 
Dimension BoD -0,308 0,336 0,361 -0,971 0,354 
Control of the parent 6,629 2,201 0,003 2,292 10,966 
Table 3.6 Results of the second model (total control as d. v.) 
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IFRS 10 2.494 1,857 0,180 -1,163 6,153 
ROEG 6,394 9,009 0,479 -11,352 24,141 
LN total activitiesG -0,474 2,781 0,865 -5,953 5,004 
Debt ratioG -2,922 2,313 0,208 -7,480 1,635 
ROEP 2,639 6,749 0,696 -10,656 15,934 
LN total activitiesP 0,575 3,015 0,849 -5,363 6,514 
Debt ratioP 5,585 3,087 0,059 -0,224 11,941 
Market to book ratioP -0,340 0,587 0,563 -1,497 0,817 
Dimension BoD -0,644 0,170 0,000 -0,981 -0,308 
Control of the parent 6,682 1,659 0,000 3,413 9,952 










IFRS 10 -2,664 1,361 0,052 -5,347 0,017 
ROEG -4,311 9,879 0,663 -23,773 15,150 
LN total activitiesG 13,735 4,850 0,005 4,180 23,290 
Debt ratioG 0,924 1,153 0,424 -1,348 3,196 
ROEP -19,730 8,960 0,029 -37,381 -2,079 
LN total activitiesP -8,552 5,100 0,095 -18,600 1,495 
Debt ratioP -2,827 1,653 0,089 -6,085 0,429 
Market to book ratioP 2,633 0,604 0,000 1,443 3,823 
Dimension BoD 0,198 0,315 0,530 -0,423 0,820 
Control of the parent 1,327 1,728 0,443 -2,076 4,730 













IFRS 10 0,067 0,030 0,025 0,008 0,126 
ROEG 0,362 0,170 0,035 0,026 0,699 
LN total activitiesG -0,300 0,109 0,006 -0,515 -0,085 
Debt ratioG -0,034 0,034 0,311 -0,102 0,032 
ROEP 0,409 0,158 0,010 0,098 0,721 
LN total activitiesP 0,191 0,118 0,109 -0,042 0,426 
Debt ratioP 0,082 0,049 0,094 -0,014 0,178 
Market to book ratioP -0,051 0,012 0,000 -0,075 -0,026 
Dimension BoD -0,002 0,006 0,668 -0,016 0,010 
Control of the parent 0,011 0,035 0,749 -0,058 0,080 










IFRS 10 -0,067 0,030 0,025 -0,126 -0,008 
ROEG -0,362 0,170 0,035 -0,699 -0,026 
LN total activitiesG 0,300 0,109 0,006 0,085 0,515 
Debt ratioG 0,034 0,034 0,311 -0,032 0,102 
ROEP -0,409 0,158 0,010 -0,721 -0,098 
LN total activitiesP -0,191 0,118 0,109 -0,426 0,042 
Debt ratioP -0,082 0,049 0,094 -0,178 0,014 
Market to book ratioP 0,051 0,012 0,000 0,026 0,075 
Dimension BoD 0,002 0,006 0,668 -0,010 0,016 
Control of the parent -0,011 0,035 0,749 -0,080 0,058 
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 3.3.1 Significative variables 
The significative variables are all those that, even without being the tool used for the obtaining 
of the answers, still show a low p-value50, suggesting the association of the relative amount 
with the dependent variable. 
Looking at our models, it is possible to notice that the significative variables change from one 
equation to the other. The only variable that is always associated to an acceptable p-value is 
that measuring the debt ratio of the parent, even if not always in the same way. 
It is possible to see, in fact, that the total control, and the direct control both, in its absolute and 
relative versions, are negatively associated with the debt ratio of the parent. Differently, we 
observe a positive association when looking at the relative equity investments and at the indirect 
control, both in its absolute and relative version. 
Eventually it happens that, rather than asking financings to third parties, parents prefer to 
directly acquire these new entities in order to exploit their activities while obtaining further 
financings.  
Then, it is also possible to focus on the natural logarithm of the total activities of groups. In 
particular, it is possible to conclude for a positive association between this variable and the 
relative equity investments, the total control, the indirect control, both in its absolute and 
relative form. This may appear an obvious result, since that we might expect that bigger groups 
are those making more equity investments and enlarging their consolidation area. 
The only case in which we account for a negative association is that in which the dependent 
variable is the relative direct control. In this case the information is different than the previous 
one, and tells about the choice between investing directly rather than indirectly. Thus it is 
possible to observe how bigger groups prefer to invest more in indirect participations. 
Finally, looking at the previous tables, it is also possible to observe the market to book ratio.  
Also in this case, there is a positive association with the relative equity investments, with the 
total control, and with the absolute and relative indirect control. This may mean that the more 
the market value of the company is higher than the accounting one, the more the acquisition of 
participations increase. Maybe, this is just a confirmation of the fact that the market is able to 
                                                          
50 The p-value shows the significance level of the estimations provided by the model. In 
particular, for the null hypothesis to be accepted, it is necessary to have a p-value smaller than 
0,1 or 0,05, on the basis of the significance we are looking for (the smaller the amount, the 
higher the significance level) (Borra, Di Ciaccio 2015). 
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see more opportunities, which imply a higher value, than what the company, through its 
accounting amounts, can see. 
Differently, it is possible to highlight a negative association with the absolute direct control. 
Those are not all the significative variables, but just the most recurring. 
On the other hand, we could analyze these levels of significance to understand whether it was 
possible to improve the quality of the model by eliminating any variable that was characterized 
by its low p-value. Since that the intention was that of keeping the same independent variables 
for all the equations adopted, we would have eliminated the amounts only if they were not 
significant in all the versions of the model.  
But, as it could be noticed looking at the previous tables, it is not possible to identify any 
variable that is remarkable for its low significance in all of the versions analyzed. Sometimes, 
in fact, the control of the parent resulted not to be that significant, some other times it was the 
dimension of the board of directors or the ROE of the parent. Anyway, any of these was always 
insignificant, and sometimes neither its exclusion from the specific regression in which it 
resulted to not be relevant, improved the results. 
Therefore, we concluded that it was not possible to exclude any of our variables, and all of them 
were approved for the final model. 
 
 3.3.2 Comments on the results of the models 
Going through the charts that report the results of the analyses, it is possible to see that the 
values assumed by the p-value associated to the research variable guide toward different 
conclusions. 
The first three models, the ones analyzing the relative equity investments, the total control and 
the direct control, present unacceptable levels of p-value. Because of that, we conclude for the 
refusal of the hypotheses one, two and three. 
All the values assumed, in fact, are above the threshold value of 0,1 which implies that the 
estimation of the relative coefficient51 is not trustworthy. 
                                                          
51 The model provided by the inferential statistic is constructed in such a way that it describes 
the correlation among the variables through the relative slopes. But those amounts, being 
computed just by looking at a part of the whole population, are nothing but an estimation of the 
Chapter Three 
 
~ 90 ~ 
 
If we go back to our hypotheses, we can better understand what these statistical results are 
telling us. 
The refusal of the first hypothesis implies that we have not observed any association between 
the relative equity investments and the introduction of the IFRS 10. Thus, it seems that parents 
have not reduced the portion of activities addressed to the purchase of equity investments. 
The refusal of the second hypothesis, instead, implies the absence of an association between 
the total linkages connecting the companies being part of the group and the introduction of the 
IFRS 10.  Thus it seems that, as Lopes and Lopes had concluded, the size of groups has not 
changed, no matter whether we measure it looking at accounting values such as the total 
activities or analyzing the connections among the subsidiaries. 
Since that the change in the consolidation rules seemed to have not implied any modification 
in parents’ investment decisions, we may conclude that the IFRS 10 had not revealed anything 
that was previously hidden. These two results may mean that parents had never been trying (or 
that they had never managed) to manipulate the consolidation principles and that they had 
always been honest in the accounting presentation of their perimeter of control. 
On the other hand, eventually this result is also suggesting the good quality of the IAS 27. Since 
that the accounting results are not particularly changing, maybe the practical functioning of the 
two sets of rules is the same, and the IFRS 10 has just brought slight additional improvements. 
It is even true that this result may be seen from a negative perspective. As a consequence, we 
may think that parents had always been hiding some of their investments and, now that the new 
rules had been introduced, they had found new loopholes. This behavior would have had no 
consequence on the accounting results, that is the reason why we conclude for the refusal of the 
hypotheses. Moreover, if this last reasoning was true, it would also imply that the introduction 
of the new standard had not particularly improved the consolidation procedures. 
But the truthfulness of this explanation is extremely undermined by the small time that 
companies have had at their disposal. It is quite hard to imagine that they have been able to 
manipulate the new rules since the very first moment in which they were introduced. 
Finally, we may think that we have not observed a period that was long enough for the 
companies to react to the new rules. Anyway, this commentary would be more founded if we 
had not looked also at the width of the consolidation area. Just because the relative equity 
                                                          
value regarding the entirety. In order to prove whether the results obtained can be generalized, 
it is required to have an acceptable value of the p-value (Borra, Di Ciaccio 2015). 
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investments of the group had not changed yet, if the IFRS 10 had revealed some hidden 
subsidiaries, the size of the group would have changed. 
Analyzing the results, we also have to conclude for the refusal of the third hypothesis. Thus it 
seems that, after the introduction of the new consolidation rules, parents have not increased the 
absolute investments in the direct participations. Going back to our reasoning52, this means that 
it has not been possible to assist to a transformation of the indirect investments in direct ones. 
The peculiarity of this specific model is that its result changes significantly once that we shift 
from the version that does not consider the robust standard errors to the one that includes them. 
In the first case, in fact, the p-value was below the threshold value of 0,1. 
What this important change lets us think is that there might be a problem in the structure of the 
model, which becomes evident once that it is furtherly checked considering the distribution of 
the errors. The first tool necessary to fix this problematic model is the analysis of the correlation 
matrix53 in which it is possible to see how some of the variables considered are strictly 
correlated one with the other. But, even after this adjustment, the results are extremely different 
which suggests further problems that have not been identified yet. 
Differently from the results related to the models just analyzed, the ones obtained from the other 
three models lead us toward a completely different direction. Looking at the indirect control 
and at the relative direct and indirect control, in fact, we observe acceptable levels of p-value 
which allows an acceptance of the hypotheses four, five and six. 
Because of that, in these cases we can observe an association between the dependent and the 
research variable. 
Looking at the indirect control, both in its absolute and in its relative form, we can observe a 
negative association with the variable stating the introduction of the IFRS 10. This result may 
suggest that, even if parents had not changed that much the size of their whole investments, 
they had changed the way in which they were investing. This is something that becomes even 
more evident looking at the positive effect exercised by the introduction of the new standard on 
the relative direct control. It seems that these new rules have led companies to invest more in 
direct participations rather than in the indirect ones, maintaining unchanged the overall amount 
invested (which is something that we have observed looking when refusing the first hypothesis). 
                                                          
52 Look at paragraph 2.2.3 Third and fourth hypothesis: analysis of direct and indirect control. 
53 See Table 3.4. 
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A first possible explanation of this result may be found in the way in which companies choose 
how to invest and in the higher relevance that the IFRS 10 has given to the de facto control. It 
might have been, in fact, that the parent was actually controlling these indirect investments, but 
through small participations, that allowed to avoid consolidation. Once that the rules had 
changed, and that they were obliged to consolidate these investments too, they ended up 
dismissing the shares. 
We may think, in fact, that the direct investments are the ones through which the parent expands 
its activity, while furtherly extending it with these indirect participations that may be hard to 
control. Perhaps the latter are tools adopted to explore new markets, to test new segments or to 
carry on any other activity which may be too risky to be tested directly by the group. Just 
because of that, parents may not be willing to introduce these companies in their consolidated 
annual report and, when obliged to do that, have opted for their dismission. It is better to directly 
run risky activities rather than consolidating entities that may be underperforming. 
Moreover, since that the parent delegates the management of these indirect ownings to its 
subsidiaries, it may be unsatisfied by such direction and may prefer to directly control them, in 
order to keep the company, while trying to improve its management itself, and to not hurt that 
much the performance of the whole group through its consolidation. 
On the other hand, if they had had no problems in explicitly stating their power, they would 
have already included these entities in their consolidated annual report, since that this 
“voluntary” consolidation was already provided by the IAS 27. 
Another possible explanation stays in the eventuality that, when trying to hide their liabilities, 
or to dislocate some undesired activities, companies build these indirect relations. Again, these 
may be entities that did not have to be consolidated, because of the small investment that the 
parent held, but things changed with the new rules. The most recent consolidation principle, in 
fact, goes beyond the simple equity investments owned when assessing whether an entity needs 
to be consolidated or not. Because of that, parent would have had to incorporate these 
companies in the consolidated financial statement, and the activities and the liabilities that had 
been left behind, now had to come back and to be brought to light. At this point, keeping the 
shares of these companies was useless and they preferred to invest more in direct participations. 
These reasonings, whether true, are furtherly proven by the fact that this negative association is 
still true only when looking at big groups, and not only at small ones54. Actually, if we remind 
                                                          
54 As anticipated in the paragraph 2.5 Deepening of the model, we have run our analyses also 
considering separately small and big groups. The tables reporting the way in which the sample 
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the research run by Hsu and Pourjalali in 201555,  this last result should not surprise us. They 
had already noticed, in fact, how the improvement of the definition of the consolidation area 
was more evident when looking at bigger groups, eventually because they had been hiding more 
subsidiaries. 
A further confirmation, then, comes from the fact that, when looking at big groups only, we can 
accept our null hypothesis also when considering the model whose dependent variable is the 
one expressing the direct control. Eventually, it was just the different behavior of small and big 
groups that caused the malfunctioning of the model that considered the whole sample. 
It can be noticed that, in all the possible explanations provided, we always refer to this “new” 
necessity of consolidating these entities, which is a statement that may leave room for 
misunderstandings. The IFRS 10, even with its new rules, has not introduced the oblige to 
consolidate, but has eventually made it inevitable. The IAS 27, in fact, in those cases in which 
a company was controlling an entity, but without owning the majority of its shares, left to the 
honesty of the parent the decision to consolidate it. In that way, their consolidation could easily 
be avoided. With the new rules this was not possible anymore. 
This is why we dare talking about this event as a “new” necessity of consolidating.  
 
3.3.3 The limits of the analysis 
Despite all the concern that we have had in the realization of our models, it is impossible to say 
that the results that we have obtained are the absolute truth. Our analysis surely presents some 
limits that cannot be forgotten when evaluating the reliability of the answers that we are 
providing. 
The first limit stays in the definition of the sample. 
The groups that we have analyzed, even if observed over a long period of seven years, can be 
considered too little. Even if the considerations that we have made should not be biased by this 
issue, considered that the p-value would have been negatively affected by that, maybe we might 
have improved the results of the other models. But, it is even true that if we had considered 
                                                          
has been categorized and the results of these additional researches are all reported in the 
Appendix. 
55 Look at paragraph 1.2.1 Defining the consolidation area: difficulties and attempts. 
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more groups, than their behavior might have been affected by more variables that we might 
have been not able to control. 
Another issue connected to our sample regards the way in which the groups observed have been 
selected. The definition of the list of the entities listed in STAR during the period 2010-2016 
was obtained through an operation of reverse engineering that might have taken us to exclude 
groups that should have been observed, and to include others that should have been excluded. 
The main problem, here, would regard the heterogeneity of the sample analyzed. 
The construction of the model may present another limit, in this case connected to the control 
variables. There might be, in fact, other factors that have not been included in these independent 
variables, but that still are exercising an influence on our research variable. 
Then, still considering the quality of the model, it is not either possible to forget about the 
correlation among some of the control variables adopted. This connection between them, in 
fact, might have somehow affected our results. 
Another limit may be represented by the fact that the IFRS 10 was not published as a standing 
alone principle, but was part of the consolidation package. All the provisions introduced in that 
occasion, in fact, regarded the accounting behavior to be adopted when reporting the relation 
with other companies. Because of that, the behavior that we have observed may be a reaction 
to the other principles introduced, or to the whole consolidation package, and not just to the 
IFSR 10. 
It is even true, anyway, that we have considered variables that were as much pertinent as 
possible to the IFRS 10 only, which should have avoided any influence due to the other 
principles of the consolidation package. 
Another limit that cannot be ignored regards the choice of the dependent variable. 
We have already presented this issue: no matter how we try to measure the control really 
exercised by the parent, there might always be at least another way that the entity has taken to 
hide it. Thus, maybe we have had to refuse our null hypothesis because we were not considering 
the right amounts, and maybe we have concluded for a relation with the introduction of the new 
consolidation principle when it was due to something else. The main problem here is that, if 
parents are really trying to cleverly hide some controlled entities, any amount shown in the 
annual report will be able to uncover it. 
On the other hand, what we have seen as a mole of our analysis, can instead be seen as a 
resource. One of the problems of our dependent variables, in fact, may be that they do not 
distinguish between a controlled entity and another one on which the parent is exercising a mere 
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influence. If, in fact, we turn the medal, it is possible to see how in this way we might also be 
including those investments on which the parent declares to have significant influence when, 
instead, is controlling them. Because of that, the results relative to the effect on the choice 
between direct and indirect investments may be even stronger since that we would be looking 
at all companies being actually controlled, and not just at the ones that the parent wants to show 
us. 
The last limit that can be highlighted regards one of the possible instruments that might have 
been adopted to improve the truthfulness of the results of the analysis. It was the observation 
of a group of control. 
The application of this tool would have consisted in the realization of the same analysis, but 
considering a set of observations that had not been impacted by the introduction of the IFRS 
10. In this way, in fact, it would have been possible to furtherly test the solidity of our results, 
especially in case of acceptance of the null hypothesis. 
In particular, if the research run on this group of control had carried the same results, it would 
have meant that what we had concluded, looking at our sample, was not necessarily the 
consequence of the new rules introduced by the new standard. On the contrary, if the results 
had been different, then we would have confirmed, with a higher level of relevance, that the 
changes in the amount of equity investments held was actually due to the impact coming from 
the consolidation package. 
This group of control might have been selected in different ways, for example looking at the 
American groups applying the GAAP, or at the Italian ones that, even not being listed, had 
chosen for the adoption of the IFRS. 
Unfortunately, the problems connected to this eventual comparison would have been too big to 
be ignored. First of all, we might have chosen to refer to the overseas groups since that, as the 
domestic ones, they were listed and the decision processes might have been similar. 
But, if we turn the medal, we see how, beyond this similarity, the two sets of data would have 
presented differences that might have strongly impacted their activity. Operating in different 
countries, in fact, is not just a matter of geographical difference, it also requires interacting with 
different markets. The most relevant difference would have regarded the different criteria of 
access to the credit market, a factor that might strongly influence the way in which the parent 
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In addition to this, it cannot either be forgotten the fact that the GAAP and the IFRS differ in 
many points, and this may affect the whole financial statement, as much as the behavior of the 
entity. Moreover, one of these differences is just about the way in which the consolidation 
principle is constructed. Differently from what is the leading idea of the IASB, in fact, the FASB 
does not give much relevance to the de facto control. The regularization of this concept, in fact, 
is not properly disciplined, despite being quite common in practice (PWC, 2008). 
Neither coming back in our country it was possible to solve the issues coming from those 
differences. In this case, in fact, we would have had met other obstacles. 
First of all, it is very difficult to compare the financial management operated by a listed 
company and that put in place by another enterprise which does not place its shares on the 
public market. If, for example, we look at their financial necessities, we see how a company 
being listed mainly needs to satisfy its investors, while the other one would also need to satisfy 
financiers, like banks. This is not a tiny difference, and has consequences on the strategical 
choices made. 
The other point regards the specific way in which the STAR selects its companies. As already 
highlighted, for an entity to place its shares on this segment, it is necessary the fulfillment of 
specific requisites. Probably, being those mainly quantitative, it would have been possible to 
identify some companies similar to the ones listed, but it might have been an impossible 
mission, especially considering that it might have been very hard to collect all the necessary 
data. 
It is quite evident, at this point, the fact that even if the analysis of a group of control might 
have allowed an improvement of the results, this was practically impossible to be realized. In 
fact, there might have been so many different elements impacting their attitude, that it would 
have been impossible to properly compare the results obtained. 
Those are the possible limits that we have identified. Eventually they have not affected in any 
way the results, or there may be others, still highly relevant, that have not been determined. The 
truth is that we would really be able to find an appropriate answer for our question only 
knowing, one by one, what the parents have been doing, without stopping at the accounting 
amounts presented. Those, in fact, may be influenced by the interpretation of the user or, more 
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 3.3.4 Clues for future researches 
Despite the many flaws that the analysis here presented may have, it is not possible to 
completely underrate the results that it has carried. 
It is absolutely true that the tools at our disposal do not allow to conclude for a relation of 
causality between the introduction of the new consolidation principle and the change in the way 
in which companies were choosing between direct and indirect investments. But this does not 
mean that we can completely neglect what the result of the analysis is suggesting. On the 
contrary, it should be appropriate starting from this point to conduct further researches that 
allow to deepen this argument. 
Eventually it is possible to run other analyses, broadening the sample, analyzing other measures 
of the actual control exercised, including other variables or trying to collect first-hand 
information, by interviewing the managers and trying to understand the policies that they realize 
and the way in which they deal with the regulation. 
It is interesting, in fact, to fully understand how economic principles affect the decisions 
regarding the management of an economic activity. 
On the other hand, for regulators, it is of absolute relevance understanding the relation of 
companies with the standards, since that those should provide the application of a treatment that 
ends up with an accounting representation that must be as close as possible to the reality. It is 








In this work we have analyzed the reaction of Italian groups to the issuance of the IFRS 10, the 
accounting principle that has substituted the IAS 27 in the regulation of the consolidated 
financial statement. 
In particular, the objective was that of verifying whether there was any association between the 
introduction of the latest accounting principle and the investment decisions made by companies. 
We have started from the clues, provided by the accounting literature, which suggested that 
parent could prefer to not consolidate some of their subsidiaries to hide undesired liabilities. 
But, since that the new regulation had made these policies harder to be put in place, we have 
hypothesized that parents had preferred to divest some of their investees. 
The research has been run testing six hypotheses, in order to analyze the behavior of parents 
from different points of view. 
On the basis of the relative results, it has been possible to conclude for the absence of any 
association between the issuance of the new rules and the portion of total activities used for the 
equity investments and the total linkages connecting the companies being part of the group. 
Since it was not possible to observe any change after the application of the IFRS 10, it seemed 
that groups had never lied about the entities that were controlling. In this case, the IAS 27 was 
already working properly, and the IFRS 10 was just an additional improvement of what we 
already had.  
But it may also be that companies were still lying and, because of that, it was not possible to 
observe any change. In this case, in fact, they might have been able to manipulate also the latest 
rules and this would have allowed to continue to hide some of their investees. Since that this 
reasoning would also affect the judgment of the way in which the IFRS 10 works, it would be 
better to specifically verify it. 
Then, it has not either been possible to observe any association between the introduction of the 
new consolidation standard and the amount of participations held directly by the parent. 
On the contrary, it has been possible to conclude for the presence of a negative association 
between the introduction of the IFRS 10 and the indirect participations (considered in absolute 
and relative terms) and of a positive association between the application of the latest 
consolidation standard and the relative direct participations. 
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What these further results seem to suggest is that, after the issuance of the new standard, it 
seems that parents (especially those of bigger groups) have dismissed some of their indirect 
participations, and this has increased the weight of the direct ones. Thus, they have not changed 
the overall investments, but have modified the management of the dichotomy between direct 
and indirect ownings. 
Summing up, the analysis developed in this thesis has allowed to improve the knowledge of the 
way in which parent companies, committed in the preparation of the consolidated financial 
statement, deal with the relative accounting principles. 
This research may have many limits, regarding the definition of the sample, the selection of the 
variables and the development of the analysis but, despite that, it allows to observe an 
interesting association between the issuance of the IFRS 10 and the investment behavior of 
companies. Since it seems that parents have reduced the indirect participations in favor of the 
direct ones, it may be that they used their indirect participated companies to run risky activities, 
such as the testing of specific markets or products, and eventually tried to avoid their 
consolidation to not affect excessively the performance of the group. But, once that their 
consolidation had become inevitable, they have decided to acquire them directly (in order to 
better monitor their management) or to definitely dismiss them. 
On the other hand, they might have really been using these investments as buckets for their 
undesired liabilities and, now that their consolidation was inevitable and that these amounts 
would have come back in their annual reports, they had preferred to dismiss the entities. 
This analysis does not provide definitive results, and surely further researches are needed. 
Anyway it has been useful to put in evidence the way in which the investment behavior of 
parent companies has changed after the issuance of the IFRS 10 and may be considered a good 
starting point for future analyses aimed at improving the regulation of the consolidated financial 
statements.  
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 1. Definition of the sample 
It follows a chart that allows to properly identify the way in which it has been realized the 












because of the 
type of activity 
Acotel Group ✓     
Aeffe ✓     
Aeroporto Guglielmo 
Marconi Di Bologna 
     
Amplifon      
Ansaldo Sts ✓     
Ascopiave ✓     
Astaldi      
Avio      
B&C Speakers      
Banca Finnat      
Banca Ifis      
Banca Sistema      
Bb Biotech      
Be      
Biesse ✓     
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Cad It      
Cairo Communication ✓     
Cembre ✓     
Cementir Holding ✓     
Centrale Del Latte 
D’Italia 
✓     
D’Amico ✓     
Dada Spa      
Datalogic ✓     
Dea Capital      
Digital Bros ✓     
Ei      
El.En. ✓     
Elica ✓     
Emak ✓     
Eprice      
Esprinet ✓     
Eurotech ✓     
Exprivia ✓     
Falck Renewables      
Fidia      
Fiera Milano      
Fila      
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Gefran ✓     
Igd - Siiq ✓     
Ima ✓     
Interpump Group ✓     
Irce ✓     
Isagro ✓     
La Doria ✓     
Landi Renzo ✓     
Marr ✓     
Massimo Zanetti 
Beverage 
     
Mondadori Editore      
Mondo TV ✓     
Mutuionline      
Nice      
Openjobmentis      
Panariagroup Industrie 
Ceramiche 
✓     
Poligrafica San 
Faustino 
     
Prima Industrie ✓     
Reno De Medici ✓     
Reply ✓     
Retelit      
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Sabaf ✓     
Saes Getters ✓     
Servizi Italia ✓     
Sesa      
Sogefi ✓     
Tamburi Investment 
Partners 
     
Tecnoinvestimenti      
Ternienergia      
Tesmec      
Txt      
Vittoria Assicurazioni      
Zignago Vetro      
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 2. Categorization of the sample 
It follows a chart that clarifies which groups have been considered as big and which, instead, 
as small. 
 
Group Small group Big group 
Acotel Group ✓   
Aeffe  ✓  
Ansaldo Sts  ✓  
Ascopiave  ✓  
Biesse  ✓  
Cairo Communication ✓   
Cembre ✓   
Cementir Holding  ✓  
Centrale Del Latte D’Italia ✓   
D’Amico  ✓  
Datalogic  ✓  
Digital Bros ✓   
El.En. ✓   
Elica ✓   
Emak  ✓  
Esprinet  ✓  
Eurotech ✓   
Exprivia ✓   
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Gefran ✓   
Igd - Siiq  ✓  
Ima  ✓  
Interpump Group  ✓  
Irce ✓   
Isagro ✓   
La Doria  ✓  
Landi Renzo ✓   
Marr  ✓  
Mondo TV ✓   
Panariagroup Industrie Ceramiche  ✓  
Prima Industrie  ✓  
Reno De Medici  ✓  
Reply  ✓  
Sabaf ✓   
Saes Getters ✓   
Servizi Italia ✓   
Sogefi  ✓  
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 3. Results of the analyses run on small and big groups separately 
As anticipated in chapter three, it now follow the tables of the analyses run referring to the big 
and the small groups separately. 








IFRS 10 -0,013 0,027 0,636 -0,067 0,041 
ROEG -0,558 0,168 0,001 -0,893 -0,224 
LN total activitiesG 0,063 0,090 0,484 -0,115 0,242 
Debt ratioG 0,068 0,034 0,046 0,001 0,136 
ROEP -0,256 0,170 0,136 -0,594 0,082 
LN total activitiesP 0,047 0,103 0,644 -0,156 0,252 
Debt ratioP -0,162 0,047 0,001 -0,256 -0,067 
Market to book ratioP 0,011 0,012 0,361 -0,013 0,036 
Dimension BoD 0,036 0,007 0,000 0,021 0,051 
Control of the parent -0,122 0,032 0,000 -0,186 -0,059 








IFRS 10 -1,166 1,421 0,414 -3,984 1,652 
ROEG -21,375 9,754 0,031 -40,710 -2,040 
LN total activitiesG 18,247 4,997 0,000 8,342 28,152 
Debt ratioG -4,229 2,551 0,100 -9,287 0,828 
ROEP 2,170 9,322 0,816 -16,308 20,648 
LN total activitiesP -15,417 5,350 0,005 -26,023 -4,812 
Debt ratioP 2,865 3,573 0,424 -4,218 9,950 
Market to book ratioP -0,393 0,846 0,643 -2,070 1,284 
Dimension BoD -0,718 0,344 0,040 -1,401 -0,034 
Control of the parent 5,040 1,760 0,005 1,550 8,529 
Table A.4 Results of the second model (total control as d. v.) 
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IFRS 10 0,106 0,546 0,846 -0,976 1,188 
ROEG -8,483 3,999 0,036 -16,410 -0,556 
LN total activitiesG 8,736 2,142 0,000 4,489 12,982 
Debt ratioG -2,389 1,157 0,041 -4,683 -0,095 
ROEP 3,075 4,016 0,446 -4,886 11,036 
LN total activitiesP -5,681 2,352 0,017 -10,345 -1,017 
Debt ratioP 3,153 1,555 0,045 0,069 6,237 
Market to book ratioP -0,631 0,312 0,046 -1,250 -0,012 
Dimension BoD -0,387 0,139 0,006 -0,663 -0,111 
Control of the parent -,364 1,016 0,001 1,349 5,380 










IFRS 10 -1,272 1,060 0,233 -3,375 0,830 
ROEG -12,891 6,589 0,053 -25,953 0,169 
LN total activitiesG 9,511 3,179 0,003 3,208 15,831 
Debt ratioG -1,839 1,507 0,225 -4,826 1,147 
ROEP -0,905 6,168 0,884 -13,132 11,321 
LN total activitiesP -9.736 3,374 0,005 -16,424 -3,047 
Debt ratioP -0,287 2,304 0,901 -4,856 4,281 
Market to book ratioP 0,238 0,604 0,694 -0,959 1,436 
Dimension BoD -0,330 0,241 0,174 -0,809 0,147 
Control of the parent 1,675 1,045 0,112 -0,396 3,746 
Table A.6 Results of the fourth model (indirect control as d. v.) 
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IFRS 10 0,055 0,039 0,166 -0,023 0,133 
ROEG 0,373 0,236 0,116 -0,094 0,842 
LN total activitiesG -0,232 0,096 0,017 -0,423 -0,041 
Debt ratioG 0,054 0,045 0,227 -0,034 0,143 
ROEP 0,142 0,222 0,523 -0,298 0,584 
LN total activitiesP 0,261 0,106 0,016 0,049 0,473 
Debt ratioP -0,016 0,073 0,826 -0,161 0,128 
Market to book ratioP -0,026 0,021 0,222 -0,070 0,016 
Dimension BoD 0,005 0,010 0,607 -0,015 0,025 
Control of the parent -0,027 0,043 0,527 -0,113 0,058 










IFRS 10 -0,055 0,039 0,166 -0,133 0,023 
ROEG -0,373 0,236 0,116 -0,842 0,094 
LN total activitiesG 0,232 0,096 0,017 0,041 0,423 
Debt ratioG -0,054 0,044 0,227 -0,143 0,034 
ROEP -0,142 0,222 0,523 -0,584 0,298 
LN total activitiesP -0,261 0,106 0,016 -0,473 -0,049 
Debt ratioP 0,016 0,073 0,826 -0,128 0,161 
Market to book ratioP 0,026 0,021 0,222 -0,016 0,070 
Dimension BoD -0,005 0,010 0,607 -0,025 0,015 
Control of the parent 0,027 0,043 0,527 -0,058 0,113 
Table A.8 Results of the sixth model (relative indirect control as d. v.) 
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IFRS 10 -0,023 0,024 0,338 -0,072 0,025 
ROEG -0,264 0,170 0,124 -0,602 0,073 
LN total activitiesG 0,226 0,110 0,043 0,007 0,446 
Debt ratioG 0,099 0,020 0,000 0,059 0,140 
ROEP -0,484 0,229 0,036 -0,938 -0,031 
LN total activitiesP -0,277 0,107 0,011 -0,489 -0,065 
Debt ratioP -0,172 0,035 0,000 -0,242 -0,102 
Market to book ratioP 0,041 0,011 0,000 0,019 0,064 
Dimension BoD -0,006 0,006 0,285 -0,019 0,005 
Control of the parent 0,136 0,033 0,000 0,069 0,203 









IFRS 10 1,388 4,115 0,736 -6,758 9,535 
ROEG 33,241 25,306 0,191 -16,856 83,338 
LN total activitiesG 16,465 7,564 0,031 1,491 31,439 
Debt ratioG -6,465 4,386 0,143 -15,149 2,217 
ROEP -40,390 27,079 0,138 -93,996 13,216 
LN total activitiesP -17,011 7,952 0,034 -32,754 -1,268 
Debt ratioP 8,261 6,083 0,177 -3,780 20,303 
Market to book ratioP 2,712 1,760 0,126 -0,772 6,197 
Dimension BoD 0,083 0,516 0,872 -0,939 1,107 
Control of the parent 8,215 3,640 0,026 1,009 15,421 
Table A.10 Results of the second model (total control as d. v.) 
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IFRS 10 5,940 3,432 0,086 -0,854 12,735 
ROEG 13,705 15,087 0,365 -16,161 43,572 
LN total activitiesG -0,069 4,869 0,989 -9,709 9,569 
Debt ratioG -10,243 3,794 0,008 -17,754 -2,732 
ROEP 12,281 15,087 0,417 -17,585 42,147 
LN total activitiesP -5,712 5,355 0,288 -16,314 4,889 
Debt ratioP 14,986 5,387 0,006 4,322 25,651 
Market to book ratioP -1,627 1,468 0,270 -4,533 1,278 
Dimension BoD -0,053 0,316 0,866 -0,680 0,573 
Control of the parent 10,039 2,734 0,000 4,626 15,453 










IFRS 10 -4,552 2,258 0,046 -9,023 -0,080 
ROEG 19,535 18,390 2,290 -16,869 55,941 
LN total activitiesG 16,534 10,019 0,101 -3,300 36,369 
Debt ratioG 3,777 2,162 0,083 -0,503 8,059 
ROEP -52,671 22,653 0,022 -97,515 -7,826 
LN total activitiesP -11,299 9,770 0,250 -30,639 8,041 
Debt ratioP -6,725 3,164 0,036 -12,989 -0,461 
Market to book ratioP 4,339 1,156 0,000 2,049 6,629 
Dimension BoD 0,137 0,429 0,750 -0,713 0,987 
Control of the parent -1,824 3,035 0,549 -7,833 4,184 
Table A.12 Results of the fourth model (indirect control as d. v.) 
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IFRS 10 0,068 0,038 0,078 -0,007 0,144 
ROEG 0,463 0,281 0,102 -0,093 1,019 
LN total activitiesG -0,218 0,172 0,207 -0,559 0,122 
Debt ratioG -0,147 0,031 0,000 -0,209 -0,084 
ROEP 1,176 0,372 0,002 0,439 1,913 
LN total activitiesP 0,135 0,170 0,428 -0,201 0,473 
Debt ratioP 0,200 0,057 0,001 0,086 0,313 
Market to book ratioP -0,094 0,022 0,000 -0,138 -0,050 
Dimension BoD -0,001 0,008 0,882 -0,018 0,016 
Control of the parent 0,052 0,053 0,323 -0,052 0,158 










IFRS 10 -0,068 0,038 0,078 -0,144 0,007 
ROEG -0,463 0,281 0,102 -1,019 0,093 
LN total activitiesG 0,218 0,172 0,207 -0,122 0,559 
Debt ratioG 0,147 0,031 0,000 0,084 0,209 
ROEP -1,176 0,372 0,002 -1,913 -0,439 
LN total activitiesP -0,135 0,170 0,428 -0,473 0,201 
Debt ratioP -0,200 0,057 0,001 -0,313 -0,086 
Market to book ratioP 0,094 0,022 0,000 0,050 0,138 
Dimension BoD 0,001 0,008 0,882 -0,016 0,018 
Control of the parent -0,052 0,053 0,323 -0,158 0,052 
Table A.14 Results of the sixth model (relative indirect control as d. v.) 
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